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The Future of Erbil-Baghdad Relations; an Unstable Federation
DRAW: Futuristic Readings - Centre for Future Studies Contents Section One: Background and the nature of the relationship: Section Two: The primary viewpoints and actors: Section Three: Scenarios and Recommendations Introduction: The relationship between Erbil and Baghdad are subject to many obstacles. Due to the nature of the relationship and the parties’ polarized and shifting positions, the two sides have thus far failed to resolve their difference and reach a final settlement on the shape of their bilateral relationship on the national, regional and international levels. Falling short of that they have even failed to resolve their deadlock and remedy their respective concerns. The burden of the decades-long unstable relationship between them has fallen mainly on the shoulders of residents. The relationship between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (‘KRI’) and Federal Iraq remains problematic without any scope of further separation between the two jurisdictions. In this state, both Erbil and Baghdad cannot forego one another and must continue working together. Hence, both sides continue their efforts to resolve the complex issues that tint their relationship. During the initial negotiation to repair their fractured relationship analysts perceived a level of understanding between the two sides’ negotiating teams. Hence, following the legislative phase of Iraq’s 2021 budget, analysts expect the relationship between them to transition to a new stage. For this reason, Ranan dedicates issue eight to a discussion into the background, main perspectives, and influential actors of the relationship. It concludes by resenting potential scenarios and recommendations for the relationship going forward. Section One: Background and the nature of the relationship: The relationship between Erbil and Baghdad is not only dependent on the governments of the day. Hence, it would be an oversight to believe that a government change in Iraq or the KRI would provide new hopes for restoring the relationship. The complexities of the relationship and its mounting problems have become protracted. Issues the relationship have often resolved through temporary fixed. In the absence of temporary solutions, problems have been left unresolved for long periods. Occasionally, even these interim measures have caused further disagreements between the two sides and added additional strains to the relationship. The challenging relationship between the Kurdistan Liberation Movement and Iraq is almost at its hundredth anniversary. Still, some of the movement’s original demands of Iraq, which established 1920 without the Kurdish region, have yet to materialize. Over this time, regardless of Iraq’s changing ideology and governance, from British mandated and colonial rule through four regime changes (mandate, monarchy, central republic and federal republic), it has continued to turn a blind eye to Kurdish demands. Iraq’s Kurds continue to have many of the same demands, while flag bearers for the same opposition to the Kurds remain in Iraq. As such the Iraqi political position runs in parallel to that of the KRI. More recently, it has been eighteen years since the collapse of the Iraqi Ba’ath party regime, and sixteen years since the passing of Iraq’s new constitution. However, the nature of Iraq’s post-2003 political system has yet to cement. While Article One of the Iraqi constitution describes Iraq as a federal state, the experience of the last 16 years has revealed that at no time have the three main ethnic groups that make up the country agreed on how to administer a “federal” Iraq. The Kurds alongside Iraq’s Shi’a community were the main parties that shaped post-war Iraq. However, these two Iraqi communities’ relationship has become more complex, colder, and acrimonious, threatening Iraq’s integrity. The source of the problems between the two communities is not merely fiscal. The current state of play was neither the will of the Kurdish Political Movement nor the Iraqi sides’ desired outcome. Instead, both sides’ anxiety, fear, and rejection have led to the current state of their relationship. It has prevented them from reaching a resolution that would restore their relationship and avoid it degrading to this point again. There have been many ups and downs in past attempts at shaping the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (‘KRG’) and the Iraqi Federal Government (‘IFG’) which have come in many forms. (Bilateral – Kurds and the British, trilateral – Kurds, Arabs and English, Iraqi bilateral – Kurds and the 1958 Iraqi republic, Kurds and the Ba’athist Republic of March 1970, international – Kurds and the 1991 international coalition that established a Kurdish autonomous zone in Iraq, and a new trilateral – Iraq, the US and the KRI.) Under US observation, the new trilateral proved to be the most influential attempt as it enshrined the principle of Iraqi federalism and Kurdish rights into the Iraqi constitution. It ushered in a new era of understanding, which between 2003 and 2014, established a largely stable framework for a relationship between Erbil and Baghdad. However, since 2017 the relationship’s development stalled and even retracted on the political, security and economic levels, It was limited to the budget and short-term laws such as loans. Today, the Iraqi constitution remains vital to the Kurds, and they want it to be the foundation of a restored relationship between them and Iraq. However, a viewpoint that has emerged on the Iraqi side (which has been espoused by several sides in Iraq) is that the Iraqi government amends the Iraqi constitution to restrict the KRIs powers. An acceptance of one another and a mutual will to end the problems between them must guide the relationship, the thinking underpinning it and outcomes of any negotiations. Turning a blind eye to issues and leaving them for future generations to resolve, which will only conclude in further humanitarian and financial cost as well as instability and ruin for both sides. The problem in post-2003 Iraq: The 2005 Iraqi constitution was drafted primarily under the influence of Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi’a communities. The Kurds enshrined federalism in the Iraqi constitution, which was one of the community’s primary aims. Regardless of this success, since its drafting, some Kurdish issues remained unresolved. For example, Iraq has not managed to resolve Kirkuk’s status and that of its other disputed territories. Furthermore, while Baghdad has indirectly accepted responsibility for financing the Peshmerga, which are formally a component of the Iraqi military, the problem of Peshmerga and even KRI finances have yet to be cleared up in the constitution. As a result, the status of Iraq’s disputed territories, Peshmerga finances, and the successive post-2005 budgets have become the current face of the relationship’s ongoing problems. These problems have on occasion even brought the two parties to the brink of confrontation. On another front, after locating large reserves of oil and gas in the KRI, in 2007 the Kurdistan Parliament passed the KRI’s Oil and Gas Law to the dissatisfaction of the IFG, who has yet to pass a law to regulate Iraq’s oil and gas sector. Consequently, the administering of oil and gas in the country has become another contention point between Erbil and Baghdad. Iraq reacted tot the passing of the Kurdish law by cutting the KRI’s share of the Iraqi budget in 2014. The KRI responded by selling oil to international markets independent of the IFG. On 16 October 2017, following the KRI’s independence referendum and Baghdad’s subsequent takeover of Kirkuk and the other Iraqi disputed territories, an atmosphere of complete mistrust developed between the two sides, further straining the already troubled relationship. The focus of the troubles between the two sides quickly shifted to economic matters after due to the depressed international oil price that had left both economies in crisis. The two sides asked questions around how much oil the KRI should hand over to Baghdad and how it should do so in a mutually beneficial way, the KRI’s share of the Iraqi budget going forward and the KRI’s access to hard cash, Iraq’s international loans and other political opportunities that the IFG was able to take advantage of but the KRI couldn’t. The basis for Iraq’s withholding of the KRI’s share of the Iraqi budget is the KRI’s oil policy, particularly its insistence on selling oil independent of Baghdad and not sending the payments to the federal government. Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi constitution outlines that Iraq has ownership and administration rights to oil wells discovered in Iraq before 2005. The articles stipulated that these wells were to be administered by the IFG and the regions and provinces together. However, the ownership and administration rights of oil wells discovered after 2005 is unclear. Analysts expected that lawmakers would draft a new law soon after the constitution passed to set out the ownership and administration rights for the post-2005 wells, but no such law has been approved to date. The IFG twice (2007 and 2011) attempted to establish an Iraqi oil and gas law; however, it failed on both occasions as the Iraqi lawmakers couldn’t reach agreement on the bill’s contents. The administration rights of oil-producing Iraqi regions and provinces was the main point of contention that led to the bills’ failure. Ultimately, the KRI supported by its own 2007 Oil and Gas Law and in the absence of a federal law began administering its oil and gas production independently, further deepening Baghdad’s divide. Section Two: The primary viewpoints and actors: Primary viewpoints: Before identifying the most influential actors in the dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, it is better to explain the two primary perspectives that have most influenced the relationship between them. First viewpoint: The KRI’s primary view of the relationship is that Iraq must be prevented from becoming a centralized nationalist, ideological, or sectarian state. Its secondary viewpoint is that while the Kurdish political movement has not historically faced issues when operating within its four current provinces, they have encountered problems operating in Kirkuk and the Iraqi disputed territories. From the period of British colonialism to its current Shi’a rulers, whenever Iraq’s leaders have denied the Kurdish political movement the right to operate in Kirkuk, the relationship between the KRI and Iraq has failed. Successive Kurdish political movements have flagged these two concerns as “red” because the Kurds, to an extent, believe that they both lead to the same negative outcome for the KRI. When any new development or crises arises in Iraq, Iraqi governments are quick to sweep Kurdish rights aside. Furthermore, the KRI attempts to normalize Kirkuk and the Iraqi disputed territories’ status, even when based on the constitution, are viewed instantly by Iraq and its regional allies through a centralized security prism and rejected. More than negatively impacting Baghdad and Erbil’s relationship, in the past, this issue has forced military confrontations and attempts to reduce the KRI’s national influence. Second viewpoint: The primary Iraqi view, which the IFG and the majority of Iraqi parliamentarians espouse is that the making concessions to the KRI may lead to the region becomes too much of a burden on the Iraqi state. Iraq’s fear of territorial dismemberment through the KRI’s separation is the primary driver of this viewpoint. This fear has been the primary influencing factor on Baghdad’s approach to its relationship with Erbil. This Iraqi view manifests in several different ways. For example, Baghdad has numerous working understandings for the term federalism, which differs from its widely accepted definition. For instance, some in Iraq understand it to mean the further empowerment of Erbil, while others understand it to be a way to maintain Iraqi unity. Baghdad’s understanding of federalism is rooted in its fear and anxiety of the KRI and not in the widely accepted international definition of the term, which is based on obligations, rights, mutual compliance, and resource and power-sharing. Influential actors: Federal Iraq: The most influential actors in the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil are the Iraqi state institutions (government and parliament). Decision-makers in Baghdad, especially those post-2017, have a strong desire to expand the central government’s powers over the country’s regions and provinces. Although the IFG’s announced its intention to dissolve the Iraqi provincial councils as an anti-corruption measure, it was also a means to reduce local governments’ power. This desire is evident in the current parliamentary discourse amongst Iraq’s younger generation of leaders and political party leaders. This viewpoint’s primary thinking is that only when the central government is strong can Iraq achieve security and economic development. Proponents openly criticize and attempt to amend articles in the constitution that empower Iraq’s regions and provinces. Furthermore, the Iraqi prime minister’s weakness in the Iraqi parliament and the presence of regional and international forces in the country means the Iraqi government does not have the necessary support to resolve Iraq’s main problems. This is as true for the problems in central and southern Iraq, as it is for the disputed territories and the KRI. Furthermore, with the Iraqi elections fast approaching, Shia political forces currently dominate the Iraqi parliament and dictate the government’s direction. Therefore, for these Shia groups, a weak prime minister is favourable. To maintain his premiership, it is not in the prime ministers’ favour to resolve the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad’s, nor is he powerful enough to do so. The direction of Iraqi and federal thinking regarding the administration of Iraqi oil is another obstacle to the restoration of relations; this has four sources: National sovereignty and effective governance: for the IFG to control all of the internal forces competing for its sovereignty, especially those that emerged after the 1991 uprisings and became more assertive in post-war Iraq, the IFG must have sole-authority over Iraq’s financial affairs. By controlling Iraq’s finances, the IFG will cut these forces’ access to the infrastructure and finances that allow them to compete. Hence, some Iraqi politicians argue that by cutting the KRI’s revenue sources, its military force, the Peshmerga, will also be starved and weakened against the Iraqi army. They believe that by first tackling the Peshmerga’s authority, this will allow the IFG to challenge Iraq’s other militia forces. If they let the Peshmerga continue, this will be read as the government’s tacit acceptance of militias Iraq. Development:Some Iraqis believe that to pass the transition period and save the country from failing, it requires centralized control of Iraq’s capabilities. The continuation of the Kurdish oil dossier outside IFG control, which in the Iraqi view sacrifices the rest of Iraq to Kurdish interests, is perceived to be Iraq’s most significant obstacle to this much-needed development. Strategy:The partition of Iraq’s economic resources and the sharing of Iraqi oil administration between the KRI and the IFG is not solely the manifestation of the post-war plan to weaken Iraq strategically. It is also a tool to prevent Iraq from regaining its former strength. Internal rivalries:Oil and its revenue, like all other resources, is a primary component of corruption, which is utilized in internal rivalries within political parties or organized groups to strengthen themselves, to gain public support and to attract cronies. Hence, some in Iraq want the IFG to take over administration of Kurdish oil to end the prevalence of non-state actors in the country and not because they want to see a strengthened Iraq. Kurdistan Region of Iraq: For the last 15 years, the KRI’s economic policy-making has mostly been independent. Kurdish leaders believed that this economic policy was in keeping with the Iraqi constitution, especially in keeping with Articles 102, 114 and 115. The KRI’s semi-independence economically was believed to be a guarantor of the region’s semi-independence politically, and a means to prevent the area from once again falling under Baghdad’s rule. Initially, the different political sides were not in agreement over the policy of an independent Kurdish economy as some believed it would cause trouble with the government in Baghdad. However, the supporters of the policy were dominant and thus became formal KRG policy. Since the IFG cut the KRI’s share of the Iraqi national budget, this policy has faced significant criticism. Furthermore, declining Kurdish income due to the fall in the international oil price has weakened the KRI’s position with respect to Baghdad. A more detailed understanding of the Kurdish position in respect to oil reveals four distinct perspectives, which are influential factors in the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil: Nationalism:For the Kurds, the administration of their oil realizes their quasi-independence, which they gained following their uprising in 1991 and has achieved formal recognition by Iraq and the wider region. It is also a means to escape their decades-long pre-1991 subjugation and isolation. Federalism:The Kurds argue that just as the 2005 Iraqi constitution established federalism as the basis of dividing power and political decision making on legislative, judicial and administrative levels, so too must this model and financial decentralization determine the division of Iraqi revenue and financial decision-making. Democracy:The Kurds argue that the basis of the Iraqi state’s re-establishment following the changes in 2003 was in contrast to the culture of the Iraqi Ba’ath party and Iraq’s previous regimes. The idea was that Iraq would distance itself from one-sided rule and Iraq’s periphery regions’ silencing. Therefore, awarding fiscal powers to the regions is one of the measures to keep the central government in check and prevent a re-emergence of authoritarian governance in Baghdad and the regions’ side-lining. Internal rivalries:To some of the parties in Kurdistan, oil and its revenue is a feature of the rivalries between the political parties and a means to maintain a balance of power between the KRI’s two administrative zones. Hence, relinquishing control of Kurdish oil risks collapsing the delicate balance of power between the zones, which in turn does not only risk insecurity in the KRI but also to Iraq more widely. However, those in the KRI who are dissatisfied with the region’s governance are beginning to support the view that the KRI should become financially and economically dependent on the IFG. They argue that all of the current unresolved issues between Erbil and Baghdad can and should resolve through the constitutional mechanism. That said, the weakness of the KRI’s economy, the region’s political parties’ non-united front against Baghdad and the lack of a powerful government in Baghdad with authority over its decision-making are contributing to the protraction of the stall of relations between Baghdad and Erbil. Regional and International Powers: It is no secret that Iraq and the Kurdistan Region are territories for regional and international powers to play out their rivalries. In Iraq, the United States and Iran are key players, but other actors such as Turkey, Europe, Russia, and Saudi Arabia also wield influence. The existence of these rivalries in Iraq, spurred on by international terrorist groups in Iraq’s different regions, has split Iraq between the influence of different international poles. As a result, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad have always been influenced by these foreign actors. These actors have sometimes worked to improve relations, while at others they have aided in the souring of relations. Section Three: Scenarios and Recommendations Scenarios: To understand the negotiations’ outcomes and to show the real picture, the possible scenarios for Erbil and Baghdad’s relationship must be put forward. It may be the case that in the parliamentary discussions on the 2021 budget law, the KRI has managed to guarantee its share in principle. Yet, as the Iraqi parliament continue to discuss the law, there is a significant possibility that the components of the law that are specific to the KRI’s share of the budget may fail to gain parliamentary approval as per the IFG’s recommendations. Therefore, this issue’s future depends on political agreement, political will, and political understanding of both the KRI and Iraqi sides. The option that most benefits both sides is that discussions and negotiations continue and as they do, the following scenarios are possible; Scenario 1: Agreement Both parties in the negotiations want to reach agreement t resolve their deadlock; however, there are disagreements on the finer details. The proposed Iraqi budget is acceptable to the KRI, as, to an extent, it does not go against the principles of the Iraqi constitution and the rights of both sides to jointly administer Iraq’s natural resources. In the negotiations, this issue of the budgets compliance with the Iraqi constitution and joint rights to manage Iraq’s natural resources is promoted more by the KRI’s negotiators as it is considered one of the regions most vital negotiating points. For its part, the IFG is demanding that the KRI comply and show goodwill by handing over its oil to SOMO Company, Iraq’s national oil administrator. Two possible outcomes can result from an agreement; A general or partial resolution: the parties agree on the KRI handing over part of its oil to SOMO Company while keeping the rest. This would be similar to the KRI’s agreement with the former Iraqi governments of Abadi and Abdulmahdi and would represent a compromise on both sides. A final resolution: the parties identify a mechanism for financing the KRI, similar to how other developed federal states around the world finance their regions. Such an outcome would be beneficial to both sides; however, the current state of politics in Iraq makes this outcome unlikely. Scenario 2: No Agreement This scenario rests on the assumption that the IFG requires that the KRI hand-over control all its oil infrastructure and revenue, a demand that some Iraqi parliamentarians are currently pushing as pre-election rhetoric as a pressure card against the Kurds. These parliamentarians support their demands by pointing to the IFG’s regular complaints that oil exported independently by the KRI hurts the Iraqi economy. The IFG protests that Kurdish crude is sold at discounted costs and have a production cost of $20 per barrel. Furthermore, it alleges corruption and a lack of transparency in the Kurdish oil sector. Therefore, these parliamentarians want to see Kurdish oil and gas administered by the IFG. However, the KRG believes these calls to be a disregard for the Iraqi constitution and an attempt to weaken the KRI’s status. Erbil perceived these views to represent movement towards centralised governance in Iraq and the KRI’s treatment as an Iraqi province. In the event that no agreement is reached the following outcomes are possible. No mutually acceptable solution can emerge, leaving both sides waiting for fresh Iraqi elections and a new opportunity for a new round of negotiations to appear. Thus, in theshort-term relations between them continue in their current form. Further difficulties emerge as a result of the KRI’s weak economy. The lack of a resolution to its financial problems with Baghdad may lead to the anger of Kurdish leaders who may, in turn, look to new options. For example, they may return to their Kurdish referendum, further distance themselves from Iraq or withdraw entirely from the Iraqi political process. This outcome is unlikely due to the disunited positions of the political parties in the KRI. Scenario 3: Mediation To reach a mutual understanding with the IFG before the 2021 Iraqi budget law passes, the KRI may look to a third-parties to mediate the negotiations. The likely parties for mediation are the United Nations, the United States or Iran. For this scenario, the KRI must act quickly before the window for this option expires (if It has not already passed). At present, the most likely scenario is the second – no agreement. The Iraqi parliament will likely not be satisfied with the IFG’s recommendation and demand that the KRI hand over all of its oil infrastructure and oil revenue to SOMO Company. For its part, the KRI will likely refuse this request, as the reasoning behind accepting the demand is from the Kurdish perspective against the Iraqi constitution. Suggestions and Recommendations: To resolve the problems between Erbil and Baghdad and to prevent the issues from becoming a cause for further foreign interference, political instability, and insecurity in Iraq and the KRI, the following recommendations are vital: Recommendations for the IFG: The IFG should work based on mutual trust between itself and the KRI and distance itself from seeking retaliation against the KRI. It should not use the issue of the KRI for electioneering or strengthen specific sides. Any future-facing agreement’s success depends on trust. However, trust between the two has been eroded, especially after the KRI’s independence referendum and the military takeover of Kirkuk and the Iraqi disputed territories. As a result, the IFG should engage in efforts to repair mutual trust. The IFG should seek solutions to ongoing problems through constitutional principles. It should distance itself from those who call for amendments to the Iraqi constitution for their benefit against Iraq’s other communities’ interests. The IFG should immediately pass an oil and gas law on the principles of Articles 111, 112, 114 and 115 of the Iraqi constitution. The IFG should also establish a stable and continuous mechanism to share oil revenue and oil and gas administration in the country. The IFG should establish an independent group specific to the just administration of Iraqi oil revenue, as detailed in Article 106 of the Iraqi constitution. To deepen discussions and negotiations and reach a solution to the ongoing problems, the IFG should establish a Federal Council (second chamber). The council should include regional and provincial representatives as is detailed in article 65 of the Iraqi constitution but has not yet been implemented. Recommendations for the KRG: Making openings with Baghdad and the IFG should be the KRI’s primary political effort alongside attempts to guarantee the KRI’s political and constitutional rights. The KRI should distance itself from the politics of abstention as it only harms the region. The KRI should practice openness with Iraq’s Arab communities (Shia and Sunni), regardless of their problems and aspirations. The KRI should avoid any policies that will cause further isolation for the region and distancing it from Iraq and Iraqi federalism. The KRI should reach a final settlement on the oil dossier that is in keeping with the Iraqi constitution, Iraqi rights, mutual rights and KRI specific rights. The KRI should attempt to distance itself from any impulsive unilateral action that may cause further upset and further degrade trust. The KRI should take more advantage of the development in the KRI’s economy and infrastructure, which would benefit Erbil and Baghdad. It should look to combine its economy with that of other parts of Iraq. Such a step will deepen mutual understanding and a closer political, cultural and social relationship. The KRI should assist other areas of Iraq in establishing another federal region in the country. The establishment of a new region would oblige Baghdad to comply with the principle of federalism. Recommendations for both the KRI and the IFG: Both sides agree that the Iraqi constitution should form the foundation of their mutual understanding and their resolutions. Therefore it is recommended that both sides focus their efforts on resolving the ongoing problem with the Iraqi oil dossier and the national budget. The two sides can achieve a resolution by utilising Articles 111 and 112 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution and learning from the experience of other developed federal systems. Ranan recommends one of the following: The IFG finances most of the KRI’s expenses (similar to the Brazilian and Venezuelan model) on the condition that the KRI accept the IFG’s authority over the management and sale of Iraq’s natural resources. Iraq part-funds the KRI’s expenses (such as the Nigerian model), on the condition that the KRI guarantees limited access to the KRI’s oil to the IFG, enough to provide income for both sides. The KRI, for the most part, funds itself (such as the UAE model), on the condition that the KRI administer and administer and sell its own natural resources. Recommendations for the international community and the region: Both regional and international forces in Iraq should play a positive role in resolving Erbil and Baghdad’s underlying issues. The current reality in Iraq and the KRI is that foreign powers ae present and influence the relationship. Therefore, to create an encouraging environment for the two sides to enter into in-depth multilateral negotiations, foreign forces should stop using Iraqi and KRI soil to settle their international rivalries. Instead, these powers should help create conditions for mutual understanding between the Erbil and Baghdad on a win-win principle. If foreign powers continue to use Iraqi and KRI soil to play out their rivalries, this will weaken Baghdad and Erbil. A weaker Iraq will make conditions in the country rife for the re-emergence of extremist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Here, the US, Iran and the UN can play a central role. Through the UN, or bilaterally, the US and Iraq can restore mutual trust between Erbil and Baghdad. Futuristic Readings No.8 -2020
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In Turkey, Kurds left with few options
DRAW: Washington Kurdish Institute Turkey’s authoritarian leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, supported by the coalition government consisting of what remains of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), have been using all means at their disposal to gradually increase the intensity of their crackdown on Turkey’s second largest opposition party, progressive, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), for years. These efforts, pursued in parallel with campaigns of military aggression and occupation of Kurdish areas outside of Turkey’s borders, have now culminated in official efforts to close the HDP once and for all. This anti-democratic move comes as no surprise to even the most casual observer of Turkey, a country that, despite claiming to be a democracy, has been known as a graveyard of political parties for decades. All political parties that have tried to use Turkey’s political institutions to give a voice to the indigenous Kurdish people have learned the limits of freedom of expression in the country, facing intimidation, brutality, and persecution. Since 1990, five major Kurdish parties have been officially banned – the People’s Labour Party (HEP), Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), the Democracy Party (DEP), People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), and The Democratic Society Party (DTP). The Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), succeeded HADEP after its closure in 2003, merged with another movement to form the DTP, and dissolved itself after calls for its closure. The DTP itself was banned in 2009. All parties that dare to give a voice to the Kurds face the unsubstantiated allegation of having ties with, or even being directed by, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which was founded in 1978 in response to the Turkish state’s atrocities against the Kurdish people and has been fighting for Kurdish rights in the country for decades. The PKK is currently labeled as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, and the US, though Belgium’s Court of Cassation, the nation’s supreme court, last year confirmed a decision by the Brussels Court of Appeals that the PKK should not be classified as a terrorist organization. Today, the HDP is facing the same accusations of connections to the PKK, a time-tested technique used by Turkish leaders long before Erdogan to promote nationalist sentiment, distract the public from the severe economic, military, and political crisis the country experienced under his regime, and neutralize a formidable opposition force in parliament. Over the last week, the Turkish lira plummeted once again after Erdogan fired the head of the central bank, causing further panic in Turkey’s sinking economy. Erdogan has a track record of meddling in the financial area to benefit himself and his family, long who are accused of mass corruption. Erdogan previously appointed his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak as Minister of Finance to enact his vision. On top of countless domestic accusations of corruption, Erdogan’s government also faced scrutiny from the US Justice Department and international courts after breaking the sanctions imposed on Iran and Venezuela and granting those countries’ autocratic regimes access to international markets. Turkey faces high unemployment and poor living conditions, especially in the Kurdish region, which has been plundered by the Turkish state since the country’s founding. Erdogan’s anti-Kurdish military policies expansionist ambitions have led Turkey into quagmires across the region. Neighboring Syria was initially an attractive venue for Turkish military adventurism as it provided a way for Erdogan to pursue two major goals: (1) ethnic cleansing of Kurds and (2) support for jihadist militant groups (e.g., al-Qaida offshoots and other similar organizations). Erdogan and the AKP seemed to expect a swift victory in Syria – In 2012, Erdogan boasted that he would soon pray at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. However, a decade after the outbreak of unrest in Syria, Turkey is now stock occupying various parts of the country and overseeing the activities of various violent jihadist militia groups, some of whom periodically fight bloody street battles with others, and bargaining with the Assad regime’s major foreign supporter, Russia, to preserve Turkish influence in Syria. Turkey’s military aggression elsewhere, from Libya to Iraq to the Caucasus and beyond, has been costly to Turkey and acted as a destabilizing force globally. Politically, Erdogan rules with an iron fist and clamps down on all dissent, a desperate attempt to hide the fact that the country is divided more than ever, as dissent grows. A number of the co-founders of Erdogan’s AKP have publicly split with him, and Erdogan maintains his grip on power by taking advantage of the privileges of his relatively new executive presidency and working hand in hand with the MHP, a party based on hate for non-Turks and the promotion of fascism. The little democracy that may once have been present in Turkey (in between military coups) is now only a memory. On various occasions, Erdogan has succeeded in diverting citizens’ attention from Turkey’s various crises by focusing on the Kurds, though the HDP has proven to be quite formidable despite his best efforts. Indeed, the HDP gave a voice not only to Kurds but also to many other citizens of Turkey who were alarmed by Erdogan’s dictatorial ambitions, and represented the most dedicated and outspoken force for gender equality in the country at a time when women’s basic rights were under increasing attack from Erdogan and the AKP. Erdogan has always seen Kurds as the enemy and has recognized the HDP as a major threat to his throne, especially after the party managed to gather so many ethnic and religious groups under the party’s umbrella. As it gained local and international prominence, the HDP was a model of the political and social diversity of Turkey. Furthermore, the HDP proved itself as a party of action and a competent political player, mobilizing voters in Istanbul and Ankara to elect opposition candidates in the 2019 local elections. After a recent failed military incursion into the Kurdish region of Iraq, Erdogan took renewed aim at the HDP. Ironically, Erdogan himself is the leader of a party that was nearly closed by Turkey’s highest court, the same court is now handling HDP’s case, in the past. Indeed, Erdogan himself officially engaged with the HDP during the solution process of 2013-2015, a process engineered by PKK founder and leader, Abdullah Ocalan, aimed at reaching a just political solution to the Kurdish issue and achieving an end to the bloodshed. This solution process, which was ultimately abandoned by Erdogan and the Turkish state, acknowledged Ocalan as the representative of the Kurdish people in Turkey. As part of this process, the HDP officially coordinated with Ocalan to bring the Kurdish issue to the agenda of Turkey’s parliament. At present, in parallel with official threats against the HDP, Erdogan and the Turkish state are taking aim at Ocalan, increasing his isolation and spreading disinformation concerning his situation as part of the psychological component of their war on the Kurdish people. Ocalan, who has been imprisoned since 1999, has been kept in almost complete isolation. Earlier this month, Turkish social media accounts spread rumors of his death and, despite the demands of Ocalan’s lawyers and Kurdish leaders and organizations worldwide, no contact with Ocalan has been permitted other than a phone call between Ocalan and his brother on March 25 which was cut short by authorities. This was the first communication between Ocalan and the outside world in almost a year. The isolation of Ocalan and shadowy threats to his life are intensifying as the HDP faces closure – the leader of the solution process is being threatened and punished, as is the party that worked with him to try to bring peace. Erdogan and the Turkish state confirmed that Ocalan and the HDP represented a path to a solution, and now seek to block the path fully and completely. The Turkish state’s efforts to ensure that the solution process of 2013-2015 remains a distant memory will not deter the Kurdish people from demanding their rights, it will just force them to chose other paths in doing so. The PKK, to this day, calls for peace in Turkey but Erdogan and the AKP-MHP alliance reject all such calls, and continues to enjoy a great deal of support and effectively resist waves of assaults by Turkey’s well financed, modern armed forces. Additionally, the millions of HDP voters and supporters who yearn for peace and demand justice will not simply disappear if the party is banned as expected. Erdogan is making it more and more difficult for a new generation of Kurds in Turkey to choose a peaceful route. Another generation will grow up witnessing Turkish state brutality and persecution, with Erdogan increasingly and more forcefully shunning any peaceful approach to the Kurdish issue and violently opposing all demands for democratization in Turkey. The Kurdish dilemma is to find a path to achieve peace and freedom. If they pursue armed struggle, they are labeled as terrorists, though when they chose peaceful political means like forming a political party to represent them in parliament, they face closure, government repression, and, again, being labeled as terrorists. In all cases, the Kurdish population continues to suffer persecution by the Turkish state while the international communities limit themselves to mild statements of condemnation. Nonetheless, the size of the Kurdish population and their strategic location makes the Kurdish issue an international issue and not merely a regional one: it is one of the most significant conflicts in the Middle East and one of the world’s most protracted armed conflicts, but has never received the attention that it deserves on the global stage. Erdogan’s latest moves against Ocalan and the HDP to silence the Kurds in every way possible will only ensure that the conflict continues in the shadows at great cost to innocent people, including Kurds, Turks, and many others.
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PKK and Kurdistan Region vie for influence on Iraq-Syria border
DRAW: Reporter By: kurdpress Despite the defeat of the ISIS, some border crossings between Iraq and Syria are still unstable due to the conflict between Kurdish movements, especially the ruling Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Carnegie Endowment wrote. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reported that the PKK and the KDP are competing for control and influence over some border crossings, such as Simelka, between Iraq and Syria. This long analytical report emphasizes that in the past few years, new developments have occured on the Syrian-Iraqi border, with Kurdish movements competing over some border points between Iraq and Syria, including the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in Syria seeking control over these points is remarkable. The report emphasizes that the PKK is trying to gain more control over some border crossings, such as Simelka and Ya'aroubia, through Syrian Kurdish forces as well as in some areas, such as Shingal. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has blamed Kurdish groups for competing in these areas for the weakness of the Syrian and Iraqi central governments in their complete control of the border areas and for their greater freedom of action. Among the effects of the control of Kurdish groups on the border crossings between Iraq and Syria, are the control of the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in Syria on the transportation of people and goods in these areas, according to the report. Regarding the PKK influence in these areas, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has pointed to its ideological and organizational ties to some local groups, such as the People's Defense Units (YPG) in Syria and the Shingal Resistance Forces. One of the consequences of these developments, Carnegie said, is the intensification of competition between Kurdish groups such as the KDP as the ruling party in the Kurdistan Region and the PKK. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also referred to the US alliance with the Syrian Kurds and the use of some border crossings between Iraq and Syria to transfer troops and equipment to Syria, as well as Turkey's willingness to take military action in these areas under the PKK. He also considered the two countries to be influential in the future of the border areas between Iraq and Syria, especially in Shingal region.
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CHALLENGES OF THE IRAQI KURDISTAN’S OIL SECTOR
DRAW: BY MOHAMMED HUSSEIN Introduction In the mid-2000s, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with the support of international oil companies, began investing in oil and gas infrastructure. In a relatively short period, it succeeded in both exporting its oil to international markets and using its produced gas to supply local power plants. However, the KRG failed to establish a successful economic policy to manage its natural resources. Such governance would have ensured managed growth and supported its oil and gas sector. Instead, the KRG’s oil and gas project became a root cause of a constitutional dispute with the Federal Government of Iraq (FGI) that resulted in political and economic damage to the region. Regardless of its lost opportunities, the KRG can still use the Kurdistan’s natural gas reserves to regrow its collapsed economy and achieve political stability. However, this is dependent on its willingness to implement structural economic reforms. The Hopes and Big Mistakes Underpinned KRG’s Energy Sector Kurdish officials were expecting their energy sector attract global and regional powers’ support to their historical Kurdish dream and cause. Initially, a significant number of multinational oil companies, such as ExxonMobil, GASPROM, Genal Energy and Total Global flocked to the region. While the KRG succeeded in attracting these companies, it failed to achieve political and economic overtures from Iraq and the international community. Instead, the region became subject to a retraction of its political relationship with FGI, regional powers and the international community. As a result, its economy faced significant damage. Many Kurdish leaders saw the development of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’s oil sector as a significant political achievement. In this regard, in the region’s general election of 2013, the Kurdistan Democratic Party referenced the regions newly established oil pipelines as s symbol of economic growth and political success. This optimism was so confident and widespread across the Kurdistan Region that in 2013 all of the Kurdish political parties voted, without the necessary economic due diligence, to make Kurdish oil sales independent of the Iraqi Federal Government. At no point were the FGI’s threats to cut the KRG’s federal budget share taken seriously by the Kurdish leadership. The Kurdish leadership labelled its independent oil sales “an independent economy”. These Kurdish steps resulted in the Kurds’ selling oil independently of Baghdad, which cut off the Kurdish share of the Iraqi Federal budget. In the first year of independent Kurdish oil sales Kurdistan made an estimated oi-income $2.3 billion (this estimate does not subtract the money owed to private oil companies), when their share of the Iraqi Federal budget was 17%; estimated at $7 billion (without subtracting the sovereign expenditures). (1) These estimates reveal that under these new arrangements the Kurds lost 77% of the amount they should have received from FGI. This loss of income was the first shock of the KRI’s new economic model; however, for political reasons, the Kurdish leadership maintained their pursuit of this new economy. Since 2014, Kurdish oil sales have never compensated its cut budget from FGI. Basic Economic Truths Those who designed this new oil-based independent economy for the Kurdistan Region ignored the basic figures of the Iraq’s oil sector. No indicator suggests that Kurdistan could have been better off selling its oil independently. Contrary, all the figures show that Kurds will be worse off. The latest data regarding Iraqi and Kurdish oil exports reveal that in August 2019 the KRG exported 474,000 barrels per day, 13% of the amount exported by the Iraqi federal government (3.6 million barrels per day). (2) Aside from the low export numbers, Kurdish profits from oil sales have further reduced as a result of litigation surrounding the sector, which has presented Kurdish oil as a risky investment. Furthermore, the cost of extraction, marketing, and export of Kurdish oil is four times that of Iraqi oil. For example, to export one barrel of oil, FGI pays approximately $6 (3), while the KRG pays about $ 25 (4) and a further $18 as transit fees to Turkey and its linked companies. While the average price of the Kurdistan’s oil was $54 per barrel in the last quarter of 2018, the KRG only received $29 for each barrel(5). Knowing these simple facts, it is clear to see the extent of economic damage caused to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, when Iraq cut the region’s 17% share national budget share. All these problems made the KRI unable to depend on its oil income, and it has kept depending on FGI’s monthly transfer. Many of the economic issues that currently face the KRG and the legal lawsuits that have blocked its oil and energy sector were for the most part expected. Iraq’s federal leaders warned Kurdish officials about these consequences; however, the Kurdish officials ignored them. The KRI’s Oil Gamble Until 2009, the most significant issue between Erbil and Baghdad was that of the Iraqi disputed territories, but when foreign oil companies flocked to Kurdistan the subject of the disputed territories shifted to a second-priority. Disagreements and discussions over the management of the natural resources (in particular oil and gas) became the issue that fuelled the degradation of relations between the two sides. As a result, the disagreements blocked the proposed oil and gas legislation from being passed, which in turn prevented the creation of a legal framework to resolve the issues. Relations between FGI and KRG continued to deteriorate to the extent that even the fight against a common enemy (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) had little effect in improving relations. Also, the Kurdish energy sector did not have many supporters in the international community. The events that followed the Kurdish independence referendum in October 2017 demonstrated how the global powers whose companies were working in the Kurdish energy sector (such as the United States, Turkey, the European Union, China and Russia) ultimately supported a united Iraq. They chose to remain silent on the Iraqi federal government and the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces’ assault on the Kurdish held Iraqi disputed territories. This event alone and the subsequent loss of Kirkuk’s oil fields reduced Kurdish daily oil exports from 609,000 to 240,000 barrels. (6) This demonstrates that Kurdish oil and natural gas can’t serve the interests of international powers better than those of the FGI. The story of the Kurdish oil and gas sector and its independent economy began when Turkish companies like Genel Energy and the Turkish Energy Company invested in the KRI. Further to this, the KRG became entirely dependent on the pipeline that delivered its oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The day following the Kurdistan independence referendum of September 2017, Recep Tayib Erdogan, the Turkish President, on an official visit to a joint military exercise between Iraq and Turkey on the border with Zaho threatened the KRI saying, “It will be over when we close the oil taps, all [their] revenues will vanish, and they will not be able to find food when our trucks stop going to northern Iraq.” (7) It is now clear that most of the political plans and decisions that were taken by the Kurdish leadership were not well thought out. Instead, the methods worked to regress the gains in autonomy already made by the Iraqi Kurds since 1991. The KRG failed to take into considerations the threats and difficulties that the geopolitics of the region posed to its plans to create an independent economy. As a result, it was clear that the new Kurdish economy, which Kurdish officials termed independent, resulted in the opposite. The KRI regressed both politically and economically when they could have used the opportunity presented by the Islamic State’s invasion of Iraq to reconcile their differences with the FGI. If they had taken this step, then the international community would have supported them. Moreover, in 2014, 2015 and 2016, the United States helped to achieve financial and military agreements between the two sides. However, neither party was successful in reaching a deal as the political willingness did not exist for a resolution. Had the government in Erbil been willing to hand over control of the KRI’s oil in 2014 as it has today, the economic damage it is currently facing would have been significantly less. Furthermore, the territorial losses it suffered in October 2017 would not have occurred. Instead, the Iraqi government may have been willing to make more overtures to the KRG as it was in a significantly weaker position after losing one-third of its territory to the Islamic State. Natural Gas in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq The KRG holds three percent of proven global gas reserves, which is estimated at 200 trillion cubic meters. (8) These reserves put the region at the eighth largest proven reserves in the world after the United Arab Emirates and more than that which Iraq has (112 trillion cubic meters). (9) If the Kurdish leadership takes lessons from its mistakes in the management of its oil sector, its natural gas reserves can be utilised as a new cornerstone for its economy and gain more political stability by selling its gas to the FGI. Natural gas is one of the Iraq’s most sought as it is required to resolve Iraq’s electricity shortages. The KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) had plans with Turkey’s Genal Energy to export its natural gas to Turkey. They planned to increase exports to 20 million cubic meters annually by early 2020. However, this plan was not implemented due to the events following the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum and the war against the Islamic State. Following this, the KRG agreed with Russian Energy Company ROSNEFT to build a $1 million-gas pipeline to export the region’s natural gas to Turkey and the European countries. The proposed pipeline would have the capacity to ship 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. (10) While investors and Kurdish officials want the KRG to export its natural gas to Turkey and the European Union, some economic experts believe that the best market for Kurdish natural gas is Iraq itself, not Turkey. By exporting to Iraq, the KRG can take significant steps towards achieving stability and its broader political goals. These objectives can form a part of any agreement on natural gas sales between the FGI and the KRG. If the KRG can broker a win-win deal, Kurdish natural gas will become a factor of political stability. It will play a role in reducing tensions between the two sides. However, if the Kurds press on with only exporting to Turkey and the European Union through the ROSNEFT pipeline, it is not clear what the KRI can achieve politically. If its previous oil sales are anything to go by, then challenges for relations between the FGI and the KRG are clear and worrying. For the KRG, Iraq is a closed market and does not come with significant cost to establish an export infrastructure. Most of the Kurdish natural gas fields in the region are located around Sulaymaniyah, Chamchamal and Duhok, and they can be used to fuel the electricity power plants across Iraq. With such a deal, the KRI would be free from paying significant transit taxes to the Turkish government and companies. Currently, the KRG pays $6 per barrel to export its oil through its pipeline with Turkey and also pays taxes and other costs to the Turkish government. According to Deloitte’s figures, the KRG sells its oil for $29 per barrel in 2017. Based on this ROSNEFT and KAR Company, who owns the Kurdistan pipeline to Turkey, gain more than 20 percent of what the KRG gains. Moreover, the taxes and costs paid to the Turkish government are even more. The exact amount is unclear due to the lack of transparency in the Kurdish oil sector. For Iraq, Kurdish natural gas would be a cheap and easy source of energy. Currently, the Iraqi government pays $11.23 per cubic meter of Iranian gas. In comparison, Germany purchases the same amount from Russia for $5.42 and Kuwait pays $6.49 for the same amount. (11) For Iraq, Iranian natural gas is not only expensive but comes with a significant headache for the Iraqi federal leaders as it must break the United States’ sanctions imposed on Iran. To import from Iran, the Iraqi government must agree to several U.S. conditions, and these conditions would get renewed every six months. A deal between the FGI and the KRG can help Iraq move away from Iranian gas and replace it with the Kurdistan’s gas. Such a deal would pave the way for a strategic partnership between the two sides that will serve the interests of peace and stability on their border and create significant economic advantages for both parties. If Kurdish natural gas allows for Iraqi city’s like Baghdad and Najaf to meet their electricity needs, it will not be easy for Baghdad to take future decisions that would damage the KRG. On the flip side, if the FGI becomes main buyer of Kurdish natural gas and a significant source of the KRI’s revenue, it will become difficult for Kurdish leaders to utilise their 20th-century nationalistic rhetoric to endanger the economic interests. Moreover, given that both governments are under internal pressures to deliver services for their people, they have no choice but to put economic cooperation before their historic personal and ethnic divides. On the international level, investment in the natural gas sector is on the increase as western governments are increasingly focused on delivering greener energy alternatives. For these government’s natural gas may be a more viable alternative to oil as it has a 30 percent less pollution rate. (12) Regarding business and markets, gas prices are more stable than those of oil. Oil is less stable and fluctuates in line with political, economic and military events. However, natural gas does not have a standard international price and relies more on agreements between buyers and sellers. The price takes into account geographies and the distance that the gas need to be transferred from seller to buyer. These facts reveal that the Kurdistan’s natural gas reserves can become a stable and reliable source of income compared to oil. Without a doubt, after Iraqi Turkey can be viewed as the second-largest potential buyer, thereby diversifying its market. Currently, Russian ROSNEFT, which is one of the leading investors of Kurdish natural gas, wants to export Kurdish natural gas to Europe via Turkey. Moreover, Turkey is looking to reduce its reliance on natural gas from Iran, Russian and Azerbaijan. For this, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is the closest and most suited source of natural gas for Turkey as several sources of the region’s natural gas is located in Duhok, on the border with Turkey. Therefore, Kurdistan can provide natural gas to Turkey and with significantly reduced costs. For Oil and Gas, Kurdistan Needs a New Vision and Economic Policy To date, the KRG has engaged in an economic model that uses oil revenues to fund public services. This model places Kurdistan into the bottom of the list of rentier countries that subject to multiple crises. This rentier economy has proven to be a significant challenge to other countries elsewhere. For example, Saudi Arabia, producing more than 10 million barrels of oil per day, is now attempting to divert its economy away from oil dependency through its Vision 2030 Plan. In Kurdistan and Iraq, both officials and ordinary people are demanding the diversification of revenue-sources; however, these demands have yet to be acted on by the respective governments. The plan for economic diversification is not a one or two-year policy decision; instead, it is a process that requires long time period. It needs implementing at a specific time where the income from oil and gas can support the introduction of new industries into the economy. Decisions to diversify revenue sources cannot only be taken as a response to crises to calm discontent and not be acted on, as happened in the KRI when its government responded to the 2017 economic crash. Income from Kurdish oil and gas sales can be utilised to reinvigorate the KRI’s economy and infrastructure. It can also be used to improve the state of public services. Instead, what we see is this income is funding a huge payroll with millions of employees, but one that cannot improve public services. It is for the KRG to take the final decision on which of these paths it wishes the Kurdistan to be on. If it continues on its current path, then it should expect to face continued crises like that of 2017. On the flip side, the KRG can choose a reform path, like the models currently under implementation by Iran and Saudi Arabia, to diversify its economy away from oil. The majority of literature written on the rentier economic model sees the model in a negative light, describing it as an “oil curse”. It begins with the fundamental truth that the nature of income and sources of income that a state relies on ultimately dictates its political character. If a government relies solely on the revenue it receives from the sale of natural resources, it will have no motivation to serve the interests and demands of its citizenry. Moreover, it makes the public powerless and unable to influence the government of the day. Hence, the level of democracy and human rights is comparatively lower in rentier states. If a government and political leaders have enough wealth at their disposal that they can effectively purchase the hearts and minds of its people then that government has no motivation to change and will continue to govern through the distribution of wealth. For the KRG, the same is true. If it wants to have better and more fitting governance, then the rentier model that it currently engages does not serve this will. It is for this reason that a program of economic reform to move away from oil and gas must be a primary objective of the KRG. Going forward, the KRG must provide employment and develop its economy through new economic sectors such as agriculture, tourism and business. Moreover, any income that it receives through the sale of its oil and gas should be reinvested in those sectors. The KRG’s current model is intrinsically weak and cannot continue to provide for the Kurdistan Region indefinitely. Moreover, it will continue to make the region unstable, in particular as it is susceptible to economic shocks and turbulence internationally. Oil and gas is only a curse because it is mismanaged, if it is managed and reinvested correctly, then oil and gas could be blessing for the Kurdistan. Conclusion The KRI made a significant investment in its oil and gas. It was able to attract international companies into the KRG’s gas sector. However, numerous economic and political mismanagement and wrong calculations around the industry brought the region into a confrontation with the FGI. This confrontation caused significant damage to the region. Most of the economic and political objectives behind the attempt to make the Kurdistan’s independent oil sales failed to materialise; instead, its effort in most cases had the reverse effects. However, this is not the end of the road as the Kurdistan Region still maintains the opportunity to take advantage of its economic resources to develop its economy and achieve political stability. The Kurdistan Region’s gas reserves can become a significant source of income for the region and become a factor for achieving political stability between Erbil and Baghdad. In effect, the Kurdistan’s natural gas reserves provides the region with a second chance to reach the objectives it has set itself and failed to meet previously with its oil sales. To achieve these objectives, Kurdistan must synchronise economic reforms with the sale of natural gas. It must take the window of opportunity to diversify its economy away from a renter model. While Kurdish natural gas reserves are vast and have the potential to provide a significant income for the Kurdistan Region, if economic reforms are ignored, then the Kurdistan Region will become subject to the same problems that it has faced in its recent sale of oil. References (1) Hussein, Mohammed. 2018. The Collateral Damage of the KRI’s Economic Policy. Middle East Center. Accessed 2019. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/04/17/the-collateral-damage-of-the-kris-economic-policy/. (2) KULLAB, SAMYA. Total Iraqi oil exports rise to 4.077m BPD in August. Iraq Oil Report. https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/total-iraqi-oil-exports-rise-to-4-077m-bpd-in-august-42079/ (3) KNOEMA Cost of Oil Production by Country. https://knoema.com/vyronoe/cost-of-oil-production-by-country. (4) Deloitte. 2019. Kurdistan Region – Iraq Oil & Gas Sector Review January 1, 2017, to June 30, 2017. KRG. Accessed 2019. http://previous.cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/2018/KRG_Oil_and_Gas_Sector__Infographics_ENG_KU_AR.pdf. (5) KRG. 2019. Oil production, export, consumption and revenue for the period October 1, 2018, to December 31 2018. May 26. Accessed September 12, 2019. http://previous.cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/2019/q4/Q4_2018_Public_Report.pdf. (6) Roberts, John M., 2018. “TURKEY AND THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ: STRAINED ENERGY RELATIONS .” Turkish Policy Quarterly. (7) BBC. 2017. Iraqi Kurds must give up on independence or go hungry - Erdogan. September 26. Accessed September 10, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41398199. (8) Ministry of Natural Resources. 2013. Vision. August 25. Accessed September 11, 2019. http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/gas/vision-gas. (9) IndexMundi. n.d. Natural Gas Reserves by Country. https://www.indexmundi.com/energy/?product=gas&graph=reserves&display=rank. (10) Ministry of Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional Government. 2017. “KRG and ROSNEFT Deal on Construction of Natural Gas Pipeline, Exports Expected in 2020.” http://mnr.krg.org. September 18. Accessed September 10, 2019. http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/press-releases/596-krg-and-rosneft-deal-on-construction-of-natural-gas-pipeline,-exports-expected-in-2020. (11) BP. 2018. “BP Statistical Review of World Energy.” https://www.bp.com. BP. June. Accessed September 9, 2019. https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2018-full-report.pdf. (12) Energy Matters. n.d. Is natural gas environmentally friendly? https://www.enbridge.com/energy-matters/energy-school/natgas-enviro-friendly.
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Gas in Iraqi Kurdistan: Market Realities, Geopolitical Opportunities
DRAW: by Matthew Zais, Barozh Aziz, Rob Waller - washingtoninstitute U.S. and Iraqi Kurdish officials discuss the future of the region's natural gas sector, including proposals for surmounting various political and commercial hurdles. On January 12, The Washington Institute held a virtual Policy Form with Matthew Zais, Barozh Aziz, and Rob Waller. Zais is the principal deputy assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of International Affairs. Aziz is a senior advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s minister of natural resources. Waller is the U.S. consul-general in Erbil, America’s top diplomat to the Kurdistan Region. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks. Matthew Zais Iraq’s gas situation is unique. Although the country possesses vast natural gas resources, it flares significant amounts of this potential supply and therefore remains dependent on neighboring countries for its energy needs. Gas resources in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will be critical in developing a solution to this challenge. KRI gas issues are not simply another aspect of U.S. policy toward Iran. Developing this sector will permit greater Iraqi energy production for both domestic consumption and exports to Turkey and other neighbors. It will also allow for greater economic integration inside the KRI and with federal Iraq, creating benefits for the entire country. The United States recognizes the importance of energy cooperation with the KRI, as the International Development Financing Corporation has demonstrated by supporting American oil and gas companies working on projects in the region. Any effort to further develop the KRI gas sector will face several challenges. Political hurdles include a dearth of collaboration between international oil companies and Kurdistan’s Ministry of Natural Resources. The abundance of sour gas in the area will require additional investment and technical expertise. From a commercial standpoint, the lack of a benchmark gas price is the central problem. Despite these barriers, the KRI has the potential to produce 40 billion cubic meters of gas annually by 2035, compared to the current level of 5 bcm per year. This vision can be achieved through a gradual process rather than an approach that focuses solely on large-scale projects. View Matthew Zais's presentation on Slideshare. Cooperating on natural gas and electricity production can bring the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraq’s federal government closer together. The KRI’s energy potential could help ease the tensions that surround yearly budget discussions. Addressing this friction would improve the region’s business climate by giving international oil companies greater certainty about financial flows. Exports of gas-produced electricity—“gas by wire”—from the KRI to federal Iraq are already occurring and are more viable than other proposed solutions to the country’s electricity woes (e.g., interconnection with power grids in Gulf Cooperation Council countries or Jordan). An eventual gas-by-pipeline connection with Turkey would likely start from Duhok, but this would not preclude gas-by-wire exports before that point. Iran consistently attempts to put a damper on Iraqi energy development through its political influence, as it wants to sustain the country’s dependence on Iranian energy and electricity imports. Tehran also manipulates its energy supplies for political ends. Iraqi politicians must find a way to overcome this challenge. Gas pricing is a crucial issue in the KRI’s relatively undeveloped market. The pricing framework must provide investors and Kurdish authorities with adequate returns while also attracting consumers to use natural gas. Two benchmarks merit close consideration: the highly competitive Turkish market, which has several sources of imported supply as well as a recent domestic gas discovery; and the Iraqi domestic market, which relies mostly on oil along with Iranian gas imports and a small amount of domestic gas. In addition, pricing will be affected by the high hydrogen sulfide content of Kurdish gas, which necessitates expensive processing upon extraction. Electricity sector reforms that address subsidies—especially those that encourage oil consumption—are also needed to develop a fair market price. The KRI has enough gas resources to export to federal Iraq and Turkey while still meeting domestic demand. Small-scale exports would likely begin via existing pipeline infrastructure. If the sector develops swiftly, it should be able to compete for Turkish supply contracts that open up as Ankara’s gas deal with Iran expires in 2026. The federal Iraqi market is much less competitive because current Iranian gas imports do not meet demand, so the KRI should be able to increase supply to the rest of the country whenever it develops the necessary capabilities. Barozh Aziz Iraqi Kurdistan struggles with a shortage of electric power. Several power station turbines are idle simply due to the unavailability of fuel. This lack of electricity hinders business development in the region, and the use of at-home diesel generators in response to power blackouts is detrimental to the environment and public health. These challenges are not caused by insufficient power generation capacity, as the region has enough capacity to share with the rest of Iraq. Development of Iraqi Kurdistan’s gas sector would help address these problems while providing the region’s residents with job opportunities. Gas investment is an inherently long-term deal, which only increases the importance of a predictable business environment. Annual budget disputes create significant uncertainty that undermines Iraqi Kurdistan’s gas sector; cooperating on gas issues with U.S. support could help build trust and alleviate this problem. The industry must also develop a solution for the high sulfur content of the region’s gas, a challenge that has stymied midstream investment. Iraqi political tensions, the threat of the Islamic State, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic have been hindrances as well. The oil experience in Iraqi Kurdistan can inform the future of the gas sector. The region did not initially possess the expertise or finances needed to develop an oil industry, but it was able to attract these elements from international oil companies. The Ministry of Natural Resources has the experience and leadership needed to apply the same methods toward developing its gas resources. Rob Waller Iraqi Kurdistan’s immense supply of hydrocarbon reserves and human capital make it an exciting place to invest, and the State Department will continue to support U.S. companies looking to enter or expand their footprint in the region. In order to attract foreign investment, the KRI must create a more transparent, competitive business environment. A recent study sponsored by the U.S. Energy Department highlights areas where the Kurdistan Regional Government can make improvements that help unlock its full economic potential. The study also points out areas where the KRI and the Iraqi federal government can cooperate. One particular point they can work together on is electricity sector modernization, which should occur alongside development of the gas sector. For example, transitioning diesel power plants to natural gas would allow for greater power generation at a lower cost. The International Development Financing Corporation has been funding expansion of the Khor Mor gas project, an important initial step in fostering greater energy cooperation between the United States and the KRI. The success of this endeavor has generated increased interest in future U.S. involvement with major energy infrastructure projects. The U.S. government is also committed to bridging the trust gap between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi federal government. Energy sector cooperation between them will help build trust that can lead to a fairer revenue-sharing agreement. Political cooperation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is also a priority for U.S. gas development policy. The United States is optimistic despite heightened tensions in the KRI, since recent protests may lead both parties to recognize that cooperation breeds prosperity.
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Production restarts at Sarqala
DRAW: Iraq Oil Report Days after the field was shut down because of disputes between politically connected trucking companies, the Kurdistan region has regained 30,000 bpd of production. The Sarqala oil field has restarted after a dispute within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party led to the temporary shutdown of its 30,000 barrels per day (bpd) of production. "It has been two days since we have resumed trucking oil from Garmiyan oil block to Khurmala, following a meeting with the deputy minister [of the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources], Ahmed Mufti,” said an official from Keep Of Oil, the subcontractor responsible for trucking oil from Sarqala to the Kurdistan region’s export pipeline. This content is for registered users. Please login to continue. If you are not a registered user, you may purchase a subscription or sign up for a free trial. Iraq Oil Report Attribution Policy All sources quoted or referenced spoke to Iraq Oil Report directly and exclusively, unless stated otherwise. Iraq Oil Report typically grants anonymity to sources that can't speak without risking their personal safety or job security. We only publish information from anonymous sources that we independently corroborate and are important to core elements of the story. We do not provide anonymity to sources whose purpose is to further personal or political agendas. Iraq Oil Report Commitment to Independence Iraq Oil Report strives to provide thoroughly vetted reporting and fair-minded analysis that enables readers to understand the dynamic events of Iraq. To meet this goal, we always seek to gather first-hand information on the ground, verify facts from multiple angles, and solicit input from every stakeholder involved in a given story. We view our independence as an integral piece of our competitive advantage. Whereas many media entities in Iraq are owned or heavily influenced by political parties, Iraq Oil Report is wholly owned by several of its employees. In a landscape that is often polarized and politicized, we are able to gather and corroborate information from an unusually wide array of sources because we can speak with all of them in good faith. To fund this enterprise, Iraq Oil Report depends on revenue from both advertising and subscriptions. Some of our advertisers and subscribers ‐ including companies, governments, and NGOs ‐ are also subjects of our reporting. Consistent with journalistic best practices, Iraq Oil Report maintains a strict firewall that removes business considerations from editorial decision-making. When we are choosing which stories to report and how to write them, our readers always come first.
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Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists
DRAW: CHLOE CORNISH - FINANCIAL TIMES Judging by Guhdar Zebari’s modest family home in Iraq’s Kurdish mountains, it is hard to imagine the journalist and activist could be a well-paid spy. But a court in Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital, ruled that he and fellow journalist Sherwan Sherwani were, according to a summary by the region’s government, “guilty of gathering classified information and passing it covertly to foreign actors in exchange for substantial sums of money” and possessing “illegal weapons”. The two were among five journalists and activists sentenced to six years in jail last month, after they covered or took part in anti-government protests in the Kurdish city of Duhok. Amnesty International called the charges “trumped-up”, while Zebari’s father says his son “was writing about corruption [and] they didn’t like his writings”. Supporters say the Duhok five are casualties in the escalating battle for free speech across Opec’s second-largest producer. In the past 18 months, dozens of Iraqi journalists have been killed, kidnapped, detained, or been taken to court on specious charges. The killings are widely blamed on militias tied to Iraq’s political system and backed by Tehran. But now the Kurdish authorities and the Iraqi state are adding to the pressure. Last weekend, the supreme judicial council in Baghdad issued arrest warrants for two political writers for defaming public authorities. One, Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, was taken from his home by police. The other lives abroad. The charges were based on a 1969 law written during the rule of the Ba’ath party, which choked dissent and cloaked Iraq in silence until it was overthrown and eradicated in the wake of the 2003 US-led invasion. Guhdar Zebari, another of the five found guilty of spying, was ‘writing about corruption [and] they didn’t like his writings’, says his father © CPJ Since 2003, Iraqis have carved out a “small space” to speak out, says Diyari Salih, a lecturer at Baghdad’s Mustansiriyah University. But he warns that the judicial council’s use of the 1969 legislation “confirms that Saddam [Hussein’s] mentality is still working in the system”. For Salih, this underscores failure “to reach the goals that we were dreaming about, to have a democratic political system”. There is media plurality in Iraq, but not much independence: most broadcasters and news outlets are owned by political parties and militias. Reporters and camera operators are regularly targeted by both Kurdish and central government administrations. When hundreds of protesters were killed by security forces and militiamen during mass anti-government protests in 2019, Iraq’s media regulator ordered 12 television and four radio stations to close, allegedly for violating media licensing rules. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has long been a haven for Arab Iraqi writers, according to Baghdad-based Salih. But he says that is changing. Now writers joke they can leave Baghdad for Erbil, but “what would we do in Erbil if we criticise the [ruling] Kurdistan Democratic party? Then no one would receive us.” Zebari, who was working for the opposition Wllat News in KRI, and Sherwani, a freelancer, were arrested after covering protests in Duhok, the KDP’s stronghold. The demonstrations focused on delayed public-sector salary payments. Reving Yassen, the journalists’ lawyer, said their trial was unfair. He pointed out that less than a week before their court date, the KDP’s head and regional premier Masrour Barzani told a press conference the defendants were spies: “Those who were detained . . . are neither activists nor journalists. Some of them were spies . . . for other countries . . . Some were saboteurs,” he claimed. The UN’s human rights office confirmed it observed the trial but has not yet given its verdict, and the regional government maintains that the judiciary is independent. But arresting journalists has become so common in KRI that the Committee to Protect Journalists, an international press freedom group, has called on the authorities to “cease harassing the media”. Back in the mountains, Zebari’s family insists he is innocent. His father says his son was writing as if “he was in a country with freedom of speech”. “For years I’ve been telling him, look, do not write these things, they will disappear you or kill you.” He sighs. “What I was expecting has happened.”
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Officer Cadet from Kurdistan shares her pride after commissioning from RMAS Sandhurst
draw: My name is Officer Cadet Midya Masti. I'm honoured to be the first female from Kurdistan to graduate from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. I am a doctor at a military hospital back home in Kurdistan with a civil rank, but when I go back from here, I will be in the military. Originally, I was in the running for the regular course. I actually went through a number of interviews before I got selected and it was narrowed down to two people, me and another girl. The team from Sandhurst liked me and offered me the commissioning course instead and I was very interested in it. When I told my family, it was Sandhurst they just said, ‘you have to go’. I got a lot of briefings on how the commissioning course was going to be. They told me it was going to be all doctors, lawyers and padres, so I thought it was going to be very simple, but it wasn’t. To be honest the first two week were very challenging, especially the exercises, the sleeping in the cold and not being allowed to use lights. I would never ever have thought I could finish a course like that. Perhaps had they told me all this at the beginning, I might not have come, but then I wouldn’t be the person I am today – to be honest, I’m very proud. It was such an amazing experience; I’m honoured to graduate from here. I hope after this, more Iraqi, Iraqi Kurdish females could join and experience this amazing opportunity. My best memories will be the amazing people I met and the fact I graduated from here because all the royalties have been to this academy, so I am honoured to graduate from a place like this. Officer Cadet Midya Masti
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Forgeries in Higher Education, there are Parliament Members on the List. .
Report by: Draw About 30 members of Kurdistan’s Parliament are studying in higher education with doing their parliamentary work at the same time, and this is against the legal regulations and contrary to the law. One of the parliament member’s names is on the list of dozens of others who have faked English Language Proficiency Certificates for the purpose of studying in higher education. According to the document “Draw” has obtained, a large number of higher education students have done forgeries. Written on the bulletin! In 2019, some names of higher education students were found on the bulletin board which was announced by the College of Arts at the University of Salahuddin, the students had faked English Language proficiency certificates. The list was removed on the bulletin of the College of Arts a few days later. According to the content of the written document, the names were placed on the blacklist by Salahaddin University for forgeries and their right to study was taken away from all universities in Kurdistan Region. In 2016, the Kurdistan Regional Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research decided that those who want to study Master or PhD must have an international English language certificate. From the time the decision was made, many types of deceptions and forgeries appeared to achieve the certificate. A group of university teachers and higher education students seeking to buy and fake the international English language certificate, especially (IELTS and TOEFL). According to the investigations, when Yousef Goran was the former minister of Higher Education in Kurdistan Regional Government's cabinet, hundreds of people have faked English language certificate in higher education studies, but the ministry and universities have largely hidden the list of the fraudulent people. The university teachers don’t have immunity, so they are legally treated as an employee. Crime of forgery has only regulated in the Articles 289 and 298 in the Iraqi Constitution, which states that frauds are dismissed from the job and no longer have the right to be re-employed. If the fraud is found guilty after a trial, the Judge will impose a sentence up to five years in prison. Members of the Parliament on the list of the frauds! Another written document from the Ministry of Higher Education is available in the previous cabinet, which emphasizes that for the 2016-2017 study year at Salahaddin University in Erbil, 24 higher education students have got fake English language certificate, who were studying at master and Phd’s level .Bahman Kaka Abdullah, the current member of Parliament from the Kurdistan Democratic Party, is on the list. Parliamentarian and Higher Education The issue is not just forgery. According to the decision of the Ministry of Higher Education and the Consultation Council, the parliamentarians of Kurdistan and Iraq, who have special ranks and positions in the ministries and offices of the regional government, they do not have the right to promote higher education, while they are in their positons. Both jobs cannot be completed at the same time. According to the investigations by “Draw”, despite the instructions from the Ministry of Higher Education and the Consultation Council, a large number of Kurdistan parliamentarians in the previous and current terms of the Kurdistan Parliament and government officials are studying inside and outside of Kurdistan. And this is against the instructions. But what is surprising is that the Ministry and the universities are taking no actions while these special ranks are studying. “Draw” has learned that in the current Kurdistan Parliament term, more than 25 members of Parliament are studying in higher education, which means they have two different jobs and it is against the law. Those who have a special ranks in higher education say that they were students before becoming parliamentarians or ministers and general directors, but this excuse is not legal, because according to the decision of the Consultation Council (No. 13 of 2014), they should have suspended their study at the time they became the member of the Parliament or started working in any other government positions. The decision shows that those who study during their parliamentary work, even their candidacies were illegal. Negative Effects (Damage) Those who have special ranks and are busy with their higher education studies, are harming public rights in some ways: • Receiving their allowance while they are studying Masters and PhDs for three years. • These people, who have special ranks, must attend their studies in Higher Education from morning to evening, which will leave their places in parliament, the ministry, government offices and other affairs closed and it will be harmful for the citizens in the region. • Doing two jobs together is disobeying the decision of the Consultation Council and the Ministry of Higher Education, and the law will be broken by the people who the special ranks. • The studies of the people who have special ranks increase the possibility of forgery in Higher Education, especially (scientific fraud), because no one can work five days a week and write a Master or PhD’s thesis. In this case, they may seek to find others to write their Master and PhD’s Thesis instead.
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P.U. K uses gas as a pressure card against K.D.P
A report by :Fazil Hama Raffat and Muhammed Rauf. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is putting and testing a new pressure upon the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). PUK wants to fight against the “PDK oil” with natural gas and start a strong economic and political relationship with Baghdad. Now, part of the natural gas in PUK areas reaches Afghanistan from Chamchamal every day. More details in this report by “Draw” Does PUK make a decision? This month, the Political Bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan will meet to discuss the latest PUK’s stance on its relations with the KDP. PUK asks for the implementation of administrative and financial decentralization for Sulaymaniyah Province, This project has not yet taken significant steps after a few months. PUK has given the KDP and the Prime Minister, Masrour Barzani ,the last permission to make their decision. If the project doesn’t start soon, it is said that PUK will make its final decision. PUK’s decision! PUK movements have recently increased in Iraq, Lahur Sheikh Jangi, PUK co-leader, has been in Baghdad several times and meets Mustafa Kazmi, the prime minister and other Iraqi officials. PUK wants to achieve a kind of decentralization to the territories which are under its rule through the Iraqi government. For this, PUK has brought up the gas file. There are three gas-rich areas In Iraq, the PUK-controlled area is one of the richest areas. PUK wants to use this gas to strengthen its economic and political position against the KDP-controlled areas, which is the leading oil producer in the region. According to “Draw” report, there is an idea in the PUK that has not yet been fully outlined. The idea is to build a company called the Sulaimaniyah Gas Company. It will be joint between Sulaimaniyah province and the Iraqi oil ministry and it controls all the oil and gas fields in the PUK-controlled areas (Taq Taq, Kor Mor, Hasira,and Chia Surkh), including the fields in Kirkuk and Khanaqin borders. "The PUK border gas can fill Iraq's internal needs and make Iraq no longer need to buy gas from Iran to operate power stations," said energy experts at the PUK. The Americans support this step and the United States has received guarantee from U.S. energy officials on this, but such a step may make Iranians worried and angry, especially when Kurdistan’s gas will be an alternative to Iran's gas in Iraq. In addition, 45,000 barrels of oil are produced daily in the PUK-controlled area, and the PUK wants to increase its oil investment level to 72,000 barrels per day through the agreement with Baghdad. PUK wants to do all this on the condition that Baghdad separately provide salaries separately for employees in the Sulaimaniyah border and deal directly with Sulaimaniyah province, not through the Kurdistan Regional Government and the KDP. This could be the reason that Masrour Barzani, the head of the regional government, recently said in front of the Kurdistan Parliament that some cases cannot be touched, as they may lead to the outbreak of civil war. To hand over gas and oil to Iraq, the PUK has resorted to Article 112 of the Iraqi constitution, which says oil and gas are run jointly between the federal government, the region and the provinces. In the PUK-controlled area in Garmian, there are two fields, Kurdamir and Topkhana, which are now escalated into conflict between the KRG and a company in the area of Sulaimaniyah (Petrolium Dynasti), the company is very close to the PUK. The Sulaimaniyah company in London Court has filed a lawsuit against Ashti Hawrami and wants to get a contract to invest in the fields, and in February this year, the Court will make its final decision, and if the Kurdistan Regional Government loses this case to the Dynasty Company, it will cause greater economic and political damage to the energy sector. The two fields, apart from oil, also has natural gas, but it has not been produced yet. Those who work for the PUK, dream of having the Turkish companies to invest gas in Garmian's fields and export it to Turkey after developing the fields and increasing the level of investment. It is unclear whether the Iraqi government will eventually reach such an agreement with the PUK. According to information achieved by “Draw” from some PUK officials that Mustafa Kazmi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, is in favour of this scheme, but the problem is that it is unclear whether Kazmi will stay as the Prime Minister or not, especially when Iraq is in front of a pre-election. Gas in Kurdistan Region According to the official website of the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdistan Region has 200 trillion cubic feet (5.7 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, which is 3% of the world's gas reserves. But this is the reserve that has not been proven, as the region's proven natural gas reserves, according to U.S. energy reports are only 25 trillion cubic feet. The Oil Price magazine which is a specific publication about energy, reported that last year only 10 trillion cubic feet were found and worked on, which is now produced in the PUK border in Kor Mor. The natural gas of Kor Mor field in Chamchamal, is produced by the United Arab Emirates — Dana Gas Company. The company now produces 430 million cubic feet, which was 850 tonnes over the past three years, showing that the UAE company has increased its investment level. The Kurdistan Region's natural gas reserves are mostly in the PUK-controlled area. Generally and geographically gas can be found in the following areas: PUK-controlled area reserve: • Kor Mor Field: 8 trillion and 200 billion cubic feet Chamchamal Field: 4 trillion and 400 billion cubic feet Miran Field: 3 trillion and 46 billion cubic feet KDP-controlled area reserve: • Bina Bawi field: 7 trillion and 100 billion cubic feet • Khurmala: 2 trillion and 260 billion cubic meters • Palkanafield: one trillion and 600 billion cubic feet • Shekhan Field: 900 billion cubic feet • Pirmam Field: 880 billion cubic feet The Kurdistan Region's gas is transferred to Afghanistan Generally, kurdistan region's natural gas is still used for local needs, meaning it is used for fuel power stations and provide household gas. What is known so far is that the Kurdistan Region's gas is not transferred to another country, but according to the information “Draw” has gained from several sources at the Bashmakh border, the company that buys the gas of the Kor Mor Field, is illegally exporting 7 to 10 tanks of Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) daily and the gas is taken to Afghanistan In the past few days, the Washington Institute has published a report on the Kurdistan Region's gas content. The report was about the discussion between the American and Kurdish officials on the future of gas in the region. One of the people who spoke in the meeting was Matthew Zais. He is the principal deputy assistant secretary for the Energy Department's Office of International Affairs. Matthew says: Kurdistan Region can increase the annual level of natural gas investment to 40 billion cubic meters by 2035, compared to the current level of gas investment in the region which is 5 billion cubic meters annually. Matthew Zais has explained that co-operation in gas and electricity production may lead them to have better relationships. Kurdistan Region's capacity in the field of energy will reduce the complexity between the region and Baghdad over the annual budget. It will also improve the circumstances in the region by giving guarantees to the worldwide oil companies in the field of oil. Matthew Zais, in another part of his speech, points out that the Kurdistan Region's power grid (electricity) is essentially generated by gas and it is exported to Iraq. Exporting electric power form Kurdistan Region to Iraq is more reasonable than the other suggestion which have been proposed to solve Iraq's electric power problems, including the suggestion to link Iraq's electric power to the power grid of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or Jordan. The US official expects that, like the region's oil exports to Turkey, the region's gas pipeline to Turkey will eventually be built, but he points out that Iran is constantly trying to restrict energy development in Iraq through its hegemony. Because according to him, Iran does not want Iraq to depend on its energy and electricity abilities. In addition, Iran is using its energy in Iraq for political purposes, so Iraqi officials must find a way to get rid of this challenge. The U.S. Consul General in Erbil, Rob Waller, said in the meeting that under the supervision of the U.S. Ministry of Energy, a recent study has been conducted on the fields in which the Kurdistan Regional Government can reform them in a way that can be rehabilitated and get benefit from them economically. One of the fields which was described in the research is the cooperation between Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi Government in electricity sector which should be renewed with the development of gas sector. Changing the power stations that use diesel to natural gas leads to less cost and more production. The American council states that the cooperation between KDP and PUK is an important priority in the public policy of the United States to develop gas sector in the region. He said in spite of having the tensions in the region, recent protests have prompted both parties to admit that their cooperation will revitalize the region, Rob Waller said. Bahroz Aziz is a senior advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government's Minister of Natural resources, attended the Washington Institute meeting and has mentioned the obstacles in front of the Kurdistan Region's gas field to develop. Aziz also said that developing Kurdistan Region's gas sector will result in the end of using generators to provide household electricity. The generators use diesel which pollute the environment and would be harmful for public health, and the development of this sector will provide job opportunities for the residents of the region. The presence of large amounts of Sulfur in the Kurdistan Region's natural gas is one of the obstacles to the development of the Kurdistan Region's gas field, said Bahroz Aziz. He also said having a lot of sulfur in the gas has paralyzed investment in the region's gas, this is alongside some other reasons such as the danger of ISIS and the spread of The Coruna virus. despite this situation, the senior advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government's minister of natural resources is optimistic about the future of gas in the region, saying: "The region did not have the expertise and money to develop its oil sector at first, but it was able to attract international companies and achieved both. The Ministry of Natural Resources needed experience and leadership to implement the same tools in the development of gas resources.
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