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A Barzani Adviser: The PUK is the reason behind the delay in government formation

Nearly a year has passed since the parliamentary elections in Kurdistan, yet the influential parties have been unable to form a new government. This highlights the depth of the political disagreements and the complexities associated with the upcoming Iraqi general elections, scheduled for November. While the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have recently held intensive negotiations to form the government, observers doubt their success at this stage. They predict that the birth of the new cabinet in the Kurdistan Region will coincide with the announcement of the results of Iraq’s parliamentary elections. The reason, they argue, is that the two parties will seek to divide government positions in both Erbil and Baghdad based on their results in the regional and federal parliaments, within the framework of a clearer agreement. Sources have revealed that Washington has for some time been exerting direct pressure on both sides to finalize the government formation process. After last week’s announcement of an agreement to resume the export of Kurdish oil through Turkey’s international port, observers predicted that negotiations over forming the new government would become more active, leading to the announcement of the new cabinet. However, sources within both parties pointed out that in the near future, they will be preoccupied with the upcoming general elections in Iraq. Kifah Mahmoud, media adviser to the president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, rejected the idea that the delay in forming the government in Kurdistan should be considered a failure. He attributed the delay to many reasons, most of which he traced back to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, while others are linked to the political situation in Iraq and the stances of certain actors whose policies are not in the interest of the Kurdistan Region. Source: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper

Water Security... Geographical Distribution of Dams and Water Projects

🔻 Based on data from the "Department of Media and Information" in the ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): 🔹 (9) Dams were constructed, with a storage capacity of (252 million and 800 thousand) cubic meters, at a cost of (265 billion and 700 million) Dinars. 🔹 (6) of the dams, costing (224 billion and 100 million) Dinars, representing (84.4%) of the total cost of the dams, are located within the administrative boundaries of Erbil Governorate. 🔹 The dams of (Diwana and Tuwrajarr), costing (32 billion and 400 million) Dinars, representing (12.2%) of the cost of the (9) dams, are located within the boundaries of Sulaimaniyah Governorate. 🔹 Only the (Khnis) dam, with a budget of (9.2 billion) Dinars and representing (3.5%) of the total dam cost, is located within the administrative boundaries of Duhok Governorate. 🔹 The ninth cabinet implemented (10) water projects, with some also in the implementation phase. The total projects have the capacity to provide (1 million and 35 thousand and 600) cubic meters of drinking water per day, at a cost of (1 trillion and 135 billion and 600 thousand) Dinars. 🔹 Out of all (10) projects, (4) of them, costing (851 billion and 700 million) Dinars, representing (75%) of the total project cost, are located within the boundaries of Erbil Governorate. 🔹 Three projects, costing (162 billion and 700 million) Dinars, representing (14.3%) of the cost of the (10) projects, are located within the boundaries of Sulaimaniyah Governorate. 🔹 Three projects, with a budget of (121 billion and 200 million) Dinars and representing (10.7%) of the project cost, are located within the administrative boundaries of Duhok Governorate. First: Geographical Distribution of Dam Construction in the Ninth Cabinet Based on data from the "Department of Media and Information" in the ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government, (9) dams were constructed, with a storage capacity of (252 million and 800 thousand) cubic meters, at a total cost of (265 billion and 700 million) Dinars. Out of all (9) dams, (6) dams costing (224 billion and 100 million) Dinars, representing (84.4%) of the total dam cost, and with a storage capacity of (222.8) million cubic meters, representing (88.1%) of the total storage capacity of the constructed dams, are located within the administrative boundaries of Erbil Governorate. These are the dams of (Aquban, Chamarga, Dwin, Gomaspan, Bastora, and Shawgair). The dams of (Diwana and Tuwrajarr), costing (32 billion and 400 million) Dinars and representing (12.2%) of the cost of the (9) dams, with a storage capacity of (23 million) cubic meters, representing (9.1%) of the total water storage capacity of the dams, are located within the boundaries of Sulaimaniyah Governorate. (Note: There is a typographical error in the original text where 23 million m3 is written as 2.8%. Based on the total 252.8 million m3, 23 million m3 is approximately 9.1%). Only the (Khnis) dam, with a budget of (9.2 billion) Dinars and representing (3.5%) of the total dam cost, and with a water storage capacity of (7 million) cubic meters, representing (2.8%) of the total water storage capacity of the dams, is located within the administrative boundaries of Duhok Governorate. Second: Geographical Distribution of Water Projects in the Ninth Cabinet The ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government implemented (10) large water projects, with some also in the implementation phase. The total projects have the capacity to provide (1 million and 35 thousand and 600) cubic meters of drinking water per day, at a total cost of (1 trillion and 135 billion and 600 thousand) Dinars. Out of all (10) projects, (4) projects costing (851 billion and 700 million) Dinars, representing (75%) of the total project cost, with a daily supply capacity of (711 thousand) cubic meters/day, representing (68.1%) of the total capacity of the constructed projects, are located within the administrative boundaries of Erbil Governorate. These are the water projects of (Rapid Water Emergency, Qushtapa, Pirmam and Surroundings, and Erbil Water Network). The water projects of (Rania – Chwarqurna – Haji Awa, Darbandikhan, and Goptapa – Chamchamal) are three projects costing (162 billion and 700 million) Dinars, representing (14.3%) of the cost of the (10) projects, with a daily water supply capacity of (156 thousand) cubic meters/day, representing (15.1%) of the total daily water supply capacity, are located within the boundaries of Sulaimaniyah Governorate. Three water projects (Faida, Akre, and Water Supply and Network Installation for 51 Villages in Barzan Area), with a budget of (121 billion and 200 million) Dinars and representing (10.7%) of the project cost, with a daily water supply capacity of (168 thousand) cubic meters/day, representing (16.2%) of the total daily water supply capacity, are located within the administrative boundaries of Duhok Governorate.

Resumption of Kurdistan Region’s Oil Exports

Iraq’s Oil Minister announced the resumption of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region through the Ministry of Oil. Hayyan Abdul-Ghani, Iraq’s Oil Minister, told Iraq’s official news agency that on September 25, a tripartite agreement was signed between the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Ministry of Natural Resources, and the companies operating in the Region’s oil fields. Under the deal, between 180,000 and 190,000 barrels per day of the Kurdistan Region’s oil will be handed over to the Ministry of Oil, with an additional 50,000 barrels per day allocated for use in the Region’s domestic refineries. The federal minister told Iraqi media: “We had anticipated reaching an agreement with the Kurdistan Region to resume exports, and today, with the pumping of crude oil toward the collection point near Fishkhabur on the Iraq–Turkey border, this expectation has become reality.” The minister explained that crude oil will continue to flow through the Iraq–Turkey pipeline to the port of Ceyhan. He stressed that technical coordination between the Oil Ministry, North Oil Company, and SOMO (Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization) is underway to raise storage levels at the Ceyhan terminal. He further noted: “After determining the required volume for export, tankers contracted under the agreement will load the crude. This fulfills the long-standing demand for the Ministry of Oil to take over and export the Kurdistan Region’s oil, which will now be marketed exclusively through SOMO.” According to the minister, 180,000–190,000 barrels per day from the Kurdistan Region will be exported. With oil currently priced at $65 per barrel, producing companies will receive $16 per barrel, in line with the first article of Iraq’s Federal Budget Law. All operating companies have signed onto this arrangement, making them bound by it. Exports from the Kurdistan Region to Turkey’s Ceyhan port had been halted since March 25, 2023. The suspension followed a ruling by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration court, which upheld Iraq’s complaint against Turkey for allowing Kurdistan’s independent oil exports through the pipeline without Baghdad’s consent. This ruling effectively collapsed the Kurdistan Region’s “independent oil economy,” which had provided nearly 80% of the KRG’s revenues. Since then, the KRG has been compelled, under Iraq’s Federal Budget Law, to transfer all oil sales and revenues to Baghdad, in return for receiving its share of the national budget. The resumption of exports announced today represents the implementation of that legal framework.

“Projected Seat Distribution in Duhok Governorate Constituency under the Modified Sainte-Laguë System (2025 Elections)”

If political parties can preserve the votes they obtained in the most recent elections (the Kurdistan parliamentary elections), at the level of the Duhok Governorate constituency, then, according to the open-list system, three political forces will be able to secure seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These are: Kurdistan Democratic Party (9 seats). New Generation (1 seat). Kurdistan Islamic Union (1 seat). In the case of an alliance of all forces and personalities outside of KDP and PUK, the result does not change: Kurdistan Democratic Party (9 seats). Alliance of forces and personalities outside of KDP and PUK (2 seats). It has been decided that on 11 October 2025, the sixth round of elections for the Iraqi Council of Representatives will be held, in accordance with Law No. (4) of 2023, the third amendment to Law No. (12) of 2018 concerning elections for the Council of Representatives and Provincial, District, and Sub-district Councils. Article (7) of the law stipulates that Article (12) is amended as follows: valid votes of each list shall be divided by the numbers (1.7, 3, 5, 7, 9, etc.) to determine the number of seats won by each constituency, based on the Modified Sainte-Laguë method. The Sainte-Laguë method was historically used first in Norway and Sweden in 1951, and in Iraq, it was tested in the provincial council elections on 20 April 2012. In this method, the number of votes for each political entity is divided by odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, …etc.). The difference between the standard Sainte-Laguë and the Modified Sainte-Laguë is that instead of dividing by (1), the votes are divided by a number greater than one, such as (1.4), (1.6), or (1.7). For example, in the 2014 Iraqi parliamentary elections, the divisor was (1.6), while in the upcoming elections, it has been set at (1.7). This means that in the sixth round of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, to convert valid votes into seats, first the votes of each political entity must be divided by (1.7), then subsequently by (3, 5, 7, 9, 11 …etc.). Previously, Iraq was divided into 83 constituencies for the fifth parliamentary elections. However, according to the latest amendment, each governorate is now a single constituency. Votes and Party Strength in Duhok Governorate According to Law No. (4) of 2023 (the third amendment to Law No. (12) of 2018), Duhok Governorate constitutes one electoral constituency, with 11 seats allocated in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Based on the most recent results of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections (20/10/2024), the following valid votes were recorded within the administrative boundaries of Duhok Governorate (total valid votes: 548,015): Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): 402,157 votes (73%). New Generation: 46,631 votes (9%). Kurdistan Islamic Union: 42,732 votes (8%). Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 28,577 votes (5%). Rênas Movement: 8,438 votes (2%). Justice Group: 3,677 votes (1%). People’s Front: 2,605 votes (<1%). Kurdistan Regional Alliance: 851 votes (~0.2%). Gorran Movement: 248 votes (~0%). Independents, individuals, and other lists: 12,099 votes (2%). Seat Allocation Forecast for Duhok Governorate If political parties can preserve their vote share from the last elections, then, following the Modified Sainte-Laguë system, the seat distribution in the 11-seat Duhok constituency will be: Kurdistan Democratic Party (9 seats). New Generation (1 seat). Kurdistan Islamic Union (1 seat). However, in the event of an alliance of forces outside of the KDP and PUK, the results will remain the same, as shown in the second table: Kurdistan Democratic Party (9 seats). Alliance of external forces (2 seats).

“By the end of this week, a tripartite agreement will be signed; oil will be handed over to SOMO”

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has expressed readiness to hand over oil to SOMO, provided that by the end of this week, a tripartite agreement (between the Federal Ministry of Oil + the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources + international oil companies) is finalized. The Kurdistan Regional Council of Ministers convened today and issued a decision regarding the resumption of oil exports, which have been halted since March 25, 2023, after Iraq filed an arbitration case against Turkey at the Paris-based International Court of Arbitration, resulting in the suspension of crude exports to Turkey’s Ceyhan port. During the meeting, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani stated that the Kurdistan Regional Government has fully carried out all its constitutional duties and obligations, and has shown maximum flexibility to remove all technical barriers that have been cited as reasons for withholding the region’s budget and salaries. The Prime Minister said: “These issues must no longer be used as an obstacle against the payment of the salaries of Kurdistan Region’s civil servants. Salaries are a legal and natural right of the people and must be transferred by the Federal Government without delay.” In a report presented during the meeting, Amanj Rahim, Secretary of the Council of Ministers, detailed the latest steps taken jointly by both the Federal and Regional Governments regarding the resumption of oil exports. He explained that the Iraqi Council of Ministers had approved these measures in its meeting yesterday, following the KRG’s prior approval and submission of the same proposals to Baghdad last week. According to the KRG statement: “In line with this new understanding, and in addition to the previous decisions of both councils of ministers requiring all oil produced in the Kurdistan Region to be handed over to SOMO (except for oil allocated for domestic consumption), the current stage has reached the drafting of a tripartite agreement for the resumption of exports. Negotiations have made significant progress and, therefore, it is expected that the agreement will be finalized by the end of this week.” The KRG Council of Ministers stressed that until the tripartite agreement (between the Federal Ministry of Oil, the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources, and the international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region) is signed, the Kurdistan Region will continue to hand over its share of oil to the Federal Ministry of Oil. For this purpose, the Council assigned the Minister of Natural Resources and the negotiation team to take the necessary steps, while urging the Federal Government to, in turn, fulfill its obligation to pay salaries without further delay. In the Iraqi Council of Ministers’ meeting yesterday, it was decided that the proposal for signing the tripartite agreement should be sent to the Ministry of Oil, and that the Ministry must submit its response to the Council within 48 hours after the meeting’s conclusion.

Erbil in the Iraqi Council of Representatives Elections 2010–2025

In the second parliamentary election of Iraq in 2010, 5 lists/alliances won seats. In the third election of 2014, 4 lists won. In the fourth election of 2018, 6 lists won. In the fifth election of 2021, only 3 lists won seats in the Council of Representatives. On 7/3/2010, the number of eligible voters was 917,685. For the upcoming sixth election (scheduled 11/11/2025), the number of eligible voters in Erbil is 1,410,112. That means the number of eligible voters has increased by 492,427 (53.7%) between 2010–2025. However, voter participation has decreased: from 680,408 voters in 2010 to only 444,253 voters in 2021 – a decline of 236,155 voters (35%). Although many general elections have been held for both the Kurdistan Parliament and the Iraqi Council of Representatives across Iraq and the Kurdistan Region (including Erbil) during the past two decades, the Kurdistan Parliament elections were mostly held on a single-constituency system, except for the latest one on 20/10/2024, which was conducted with multiple constituencies. In contrast, the Iraqi parliamentary elections were always conducted with multi-constituency divisions, but until the fifth election (2021), Erbil was considered a single constituency. In the 2021 election, under the new law, Erbil was divided into 4 constituencies. This report reviews the results of Iraqi parliamentary elections in Erbil, analyzing eligible voters, participation rates, competing parties, and winning seats. 1. Erbil in the 2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (7/3/2010) Eligible voters: 917,685 Actual voters: 680,408 (74%) Seats: 14 general + 1 minority (Christian) Results: Kurdistan Alliance (PDK + PUK + others): 458,403 votes → 10 seats PDK: 306,775 votes → 8 seats PUK: 124,632 votes → 2 seats Gorran Movement: 103,397 votes → 2 seats Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal): 70,662 votes → 1 seat Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU): 51,065 votes → 1 seat 2. Erbil in the 2014 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (30/4/2014) Eligible voters: 936,557 Actual voters: 744,489 (79.5%) Seats: 15 Results: PDK: 354,735 votes (48%) → 7 seats PUK: 168,688 votes (23%) → 4 seats Gorran: 104,059 votes (14%) → 2 seats Komal: 80,492 votes (11%) → 2 seats KIU: 26,323 votes (4%) → 0 seats 3. Erbil in the 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (12/5/2018) Eligible voters: 1,123,219 Actual voters: 642,232 (57.2%) Seats: 15 Results: PDK: 321,920 votes (50%) → 8 seats PUK: 79,945 votes (12%) → 2 seats New Generation: 70,833 votes (11%) → 2 seats Gorran: 40,863 votes (6%) → 1 seat Komal: 36,784 votes (6%) → 1 seat Coalition for Democracy & Justice: 50,537 votes (8%) → 1 seat KIU: 24,475 votes (4%) → 0 seats 4. Erbil in the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (10/10/2021) Eligible voters: 1,238,379 Actual voters: 444,253 (35.9%) Seats: 15 (across 4 constituencies) Results: PDK: 262,800 votes (59.2%) → 11 seats New Generation: 79,245 votes (17.8%) → 3 seats PUK: 65,862 votes (14.8%) → 1 seat Komal for Justice: 19,517 votes (4.4%) → 0 seats Gorran (in alliance with PUK): 4,245 votes (1%) → 0 seats KIU: 3,990 votes (0.9%) → 0 seats Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2,167 votes (0.5%) → 0 seats Independents & small groups: 6,427 votes (1.4%) → 0 seats 5. Eligible Voters & Participation Trends in Erbil (2010–2025) 2010: 917,685 eligible – 680,408 voted (74%) 2014: 936,557 eligible – 744,489 voted (79.5%) 2018: 1,123,219 eligible – 642,232 voted (57.2%) 2021: 1,238,379 eligible – 444,253 voted (35.9%) 2025 (projected): 1,410,112 eligible – turnout TBD Key points: The number of eligible voters grew by 53.7% (492,427 more) between 2010–2025. The number of actual voters declined by 35% between 2010 (680k) and 2021 (444k).

Open Dialogue on Journalists’ Issues

Today at the main office of Draw, an open dialogue was held on “The Situation of Journalism and Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region.” The discussion, moderated by writer and journalist Kemal Raouf, brought together writers and journalists to exchange views on the topic. In particular, considerable attention was given to the current state of freedom of expression and journalism in the Kurdistan Region, which many argue is under pressure. Have the government and those in power restricted freedom of expression? Especially after the imprisonment of Sherwan Sherwani, the attack on Hemen Mamand, and the incidents in Lalazar—as well as other recent events across the Kurdistan Region—many journalists and activists have felt an atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty. Where is this situation heading? Is it a normal state of affairs, or is it a reflection of broader domestic, regional, and geopolitical dynamics?

Barzani Warns of ISIS Resurgence if U.S. Withdraws

Masoud Barzani: 🔻 If America withdraws, I fear ISIS will return 🔻 I hope Abdullah Öcalan will be freed Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), stated that he has no doubt the same scenario after 2012 could repeat itself and that the Islamic State (ISIS) may re-emerge if the international coalition forces led by the United States withdraw from the region. He emphasized that the threat of ISIS remains, and this has been officially announced. In an interview with France 24, Barzani spoke about the situation of the Kurdish minority in Syria, the disarmament of the PKK in Turkey, and the planned withdrawal of coalition forces led by the U.S. from Iraq by the end of this year. According to the source, regarding Syria’s situation, Barzani said: in March of this year, an agreement was signed between Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Ahmed Jarba, former Syrian opposition leader. The agreement referred to unifying Kurdish military and civilian institutions with the central government. However, Barzani noted that this agreement has not yet been implemented, which in his view has created risks of withdrawal, disruption, and worsening relations between Kurds and Arabs, as well as external interventions. Barzani stressed the need to resolve issues through dialogue, not war, since war is not a solution, and governments must take into account the diversity of their societies. Regarding the possibility of Turkish military action against the SDF, Barzani said he believes Turkey supports a peaceful resolution and has backed the March agreement so it can be implemented. He also welcomed the disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), expressing hope that it could pave the way for peace and the release of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Barzani said: I hope he will be freed.

Dispute Deepens Within Kurdistan’s Human Rights Team Over Lalazar Case and Political Bias

A section of the Independent Human Rights Team rejects a recent statement, calling it politically motivated. They stress Slemani security cooperated in cases like Lalazar, but question the Team’s silence on Khorshid Herki, Hemen Mamand, Sherwan Sherwani, Shwan Saber, Sheikh Adham Barzani, and Rashid Agha, warning such bias harms credibility. On September 5, 2025, the Independent Human Rights Team in the Kurdistan Region issued a statement criticizing Slemani security forces for withholding information on missing persons linked to the Lalazar clashes and the case of Aram Qadir, urging transparency, family access, and the formation of a high-level investigative committee.

What do the data and forecasts tell us..?

By: Luqman Hawiz Important Note: The information and analyses presented here are based on available collected data. The forecasts and datasets regarding the likelihood of continuing neutral conditions and a return to La Niña in the ENSO state have been published by NOAA, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the world’s primary agency for weather, climate, and ocean monitoring. In past years, I have based all my forecasts on NOAA data, and at least 70%–80% of those forecasts proved accurate. However, since weather forecasts generally depend on many changing variables, predictions can’t be 100% accurate. To fully understand, please also read the conclusion, which includes further analysis. Unfortunately, in Kurdistan’s social media scene, only a few individuals, such as Aras Jabar and Sirwan Salih (and perhaps others I don’t know), present scientific weather discussions with data-based analysis. Many others claim to be “meteorologists” but share predictions without any scientific basis or reliable data. Please be cautious and don’t believe every prediction from unqualified sources. In summary, the forecasts based on data tell us the following (with more details below): Very briefly, rainfall during the upcoming 2025–2026 wet season will be below average, especially in October, November, December, and January. Overall, from October 2025 through March 2026, rainfall will be lower than the average of a normal year. However, compared with last year’s rainfall, it will be slightly better because the La Niña phase expected this season is weaker than the strong La Niña that dominated last year. Generally, rainfall in most areas of Kurdistan will be about 40% to 60% of a normal year’s rainfall, varying depending on location. More scientific context: In general, during El Niño events, rainfall across Syria, southern and central Iraq, Kurdistan, and Iran tends to be normal or above average. Most of the time, it is above average. During neutral ENSO phases, rainfall tends to be normal or slightly below average. During La Niña events, rainfall is significantly below average, leading to dry or semi-dry seasons. What are El Niño, La Niña, and ENSO Neutral conditions in meteorology? These phenomena occur in the central Pacific Ocean near the equator. La Niña = cooling of surface waters in the central and eastern Pacific by about 1–2°C below the long-term average. El Niño = warming of the same waters by about 1–2°C above the average. Neutral ENSO = when temperatures are close to the long-term average. These shifts occur due to changes in wind speed and direction over the Pacific, and they influence weather patterns globally—especially in the Americas, the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Each phase can last from several months to up to two years. How were El Niño, La Niña, and Neutral phases last year and this year, and what’s expected for the upcoming season? 2023–2024 winter: Strong El Niño was present → resulted in a wet, rainy season (forecasted correctly). Spring 2024: El Niño ended. March 2024 – February 2025: Strong La Niña dominated → resulted in a dry 2024–2025 season (forecasted correctly). Since March 2025: Neutral conditions have prevailed (no El Niño, no La Niña). Forecast for Fall 2025: A weaker La Niña is expected to re-emerge around late September or October 2025, possibly lasting until February 2026. This means below-average rainfall again, though less severe than last year. Spring 2026: Neutral conditions are expected to return, which may improve rainfall in March–April 2026 compared to winter months. Additional regional factor: Due to climate change and global warming, the surface temperature of the Red Sea has been steadily rising in recent years. This has increased evaporation and the frequency of humid air masses moving north. As a result, flash floods and heavy downpours in Saudi Arabia have become more common in recent years. This sometimes also affects southern and central Iraq. For this year, such Red Sea influences are again likely, but with weaker effects on Kurdistan compared to Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq.

Shaikan Oil Field: Production and Revenue of the First Half of 2025

Source: Roonbin Organization for Transparency in Oil Processes Author: Yadgar Sdiq Galali Summary of Production and Revenues The Shaikan oil field’s average daily production in the first eight months of 2025 was 41,638 barrels per day, sold at an average price of $27 per barrel. Total revenues: $268 million Share of companies: 44.6% → $100 million for Gulf Keystone (GKP) and $19 million for MOL Share of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): $148 million → 55.4% Introduction This report is based on company reports, joint-production agreements, and field data verified by our observers. It: Tracks monthly production and sales. Details revenues and cost-sharing between KRG, GKP, and MOL. Discloses company debts, costs, and profits. Provides background on Shaikan field and its reserves. Uses simplified language for public accessibility. Production Trends (Jan – Aug 2025) Jan – May: Production averaged >46,500 barrels/day. June: Dropped to 31,800 bpd due to Eid al-Adha and the 12-day Iran–Israel war. July: Further fell to 21,200 bpd after a drone strike near Shaikan (affecting nearby fields). August: Recovered to 39,600 bpd by Aug 26. Current output stabilized at ~45,000 bpd (26,000 from PF-1, 19,000 from PF-2). Comparison: H1 2025 production: 44,100 bpd (+12% vs H1 2024 at 39,252 bpd). First 8 months total: 9.6 million barrels. Revenues Average oil price (H1 2025): $27.8/bbl → up 6% from $26.3 in H1 2024. Still $44.1 below Brent crude (average Brent price: $71.9). Total revenues H1 2025: $221.9m GKP: $83.1m (+17% vs 2024) MOL: $16m KRG: $122.8m Total revenues Jan–Aug 2025: $268.9m GKP: $100.7m MOL: $19.3m KRG: $148.8m Costs & Profits Operating costs (H1 2025): $26.9m (+13% from 2024, mainly due to reopening two wells). Operating cost per barrel: ~$4.4 (unchanged). Capital expenditure: $18.1m (up from $7.8m in 2024, mainly for PF-2 upgrades). Expected to reach $30–35m by year-end 2025. Profit distribution: $25m already paid to shareholders in H1 2025. Another $25m scheduled for Sept 30. Total dividends 2025: $50m → $0.1152/share. Future Plans PF-2 water handling unit scheduled for 2027, expected to add 4,000–8,000 bpd and reduce gas flaring. Oil continues to be sold to domestic buyers in Kurdistan since pipeline exports stopped. Price range: $27–28/bbl. Company Debts & KRG Arrears Total KRG debts to GKP + MOL: $192.8m (including $150.5m unpaid costs + $42.3m unpaid profits). GKP share: $151.1m (120.4m opex + 30.7m profit). MOL share: $42.7m (30.1m opex + 11.6m profit). KRG commercial debt: $171m, tied to crude exports (Oct 2022 – Mar 2023). Shaikan Field Overview Location: Duhok governorate, 60 km NW of Erbil. Operators: Gulf Keystone (UK) 80%, MOL (Hungary) 20%. Oil discovered: Aug 2009, production began 2013. Total produced (up to Aug 26, 2025): 145m barrels. Oil quality: heavy crude, API 27°, high sulfur, discounted by ~$23–29 below Brent. Wells: 18 total, tied to PF-1 & PF-2 facilities (capacity: 60,000 bpd). Reserves (end of 2023): 1P (Proven): 224m barrels 2P (Probable): 489m barrels Production lifespan estimate: ~28 years → economic cutoff in 2047. The Shaikan oil field remained stable despite war and drone attacks in mid-2025. Production averaged 41.6k bpd in the first 8 months, generating $268m revenues (55.4% to KRG). Costs remain low ($4.4/bbl), and dividend payments continue. However, KRG still owes $192.8m in arrears to the companies.

One month since the KRG became inactive

It has been about a month since the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) became inactive, while Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, have both been outside the country for several days. According to follow-ups: Masoud Barzani, the KDP President, has been in Germany for medical check-ups for several days and has not yet returned. Masrour Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister, has been in the United States with his family for more than 20 days. Normally, the KRG Council of Ministers convenes every Wednesday, but due to the Prime Minister’s absence, the council has not met for four consecutive weeks. The last meeting was held on July 30, 2025, meaning that the government has effectively been inactive for about a month. This inactivity comes as the month of September approaches, while civil servants in the Kurdistan Region still have not received their June salaries, despite the existence of a government and parliament amid ongoing crises, conflicts, and political turmoil in the region.

Fate of Lahur Sheikh Jangi

Lahur Sheikh Jangi, leader of the (People's Front ), is currently in the custody of the Sulaimani security forces. Will he be tried in court? Or will be handed over to the UK as a British citizen? Did he surrender, or was he captured? Who was the commander in Lalazar who was able to escape? Beginning of the Events Over the past two months, especially after the protests in Sulaimani and their suppression by the security forces — with fears that others would also join in — some PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) leaders believed there was a security shake-up. Several senior military officers gathered to discuss these concerns, raising suspicions of a coup or internal instability. The PUK then launched security operations. A week before the attack on Lalazar, armed clashes took place around 5:00 AM. Two people were injured in the fighting. Lahur Sheikh Jangi’s associates informed Asayish (security) about the incident, but officials at Lalazar insisted they had already provided videos and evidence to Asayish, which had ignored them. Bafel Talabani’s side is talking about an assassination attempt, accusing Lahur Sheikh Jangi and another security official of trying to assassinate Bafel Talabani using a drone. Lahur dismissed this, saying it was internal PUK disputes, not a plot linked to him. On August 20, Bafel Talabani traveled to Baghdad, informing several embassies (US, UK, France) and Iraqi political leaders about plans to strike against Lahur Sheikh Jangi. He returned to Dabashan (PUK HQ) the same evening under heavy security with convoys and helicopters flying overhead. On August 21, in the afternoon, checkpoints were closed and all roads monitored to prevent Lahur’s associates from moving. Security forces, including counter-terrorism, commandos, and SWAT, were fully mobilized with armored vehicles, artillery, and drones, set for 3:00 AM. Lalazar was defended by about 200 men from the KRG Interior Ministry alongside Polad Sheikh Jangi, Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghali, and Ahmed Asaf. However, none of Lahur’s traditional allies or defectors joined them. At night, Lahur called Sulaimani’s Asayish chief, asking about the attacking forces. He was told there was a warrant for his arrest and urged to surrender. During the heated exchanges, Bafel Talabani himself intervened several times by phone, insisting Lahur must give up. Lahur refused, warning, “You will pay the price if you come.” Around 3:30 AM, heavy clashes broke out. For more than three hours, counter-terrorism forces, commando units, armored vehicles, drones, and artillery were used. Lalazar’s defenders resisted fiercely. Eventually, drones bombarded Lalazar, allowing commandos to storm the compound. By then, many of Lahur’s men were out of ammunition and surrendered. Lahur was captured while trying to help his brother Polad Sheikh Jangi, who had been badly wounded. Wahab Halabjai escorted Lahur, Polad, Zino Mohammed, and Fink Ahmed out of the compound under arrest. Awat Sheikh Jangi Awat, Lahur’s sister, insisted on joining the fight despite her ill health, saying she couldn’t abandon her brothers. She stayed with them until the end, even at the moment of Lahur’s capture. Lahur’s other brothers — Aras, Hiwa, and Ako — were abroad. His wife and children were also not in Kurdistan. Other Commanders Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghali: Fought for hours, refusing to surrender. Eventually, his father was pressured to persuade him. He finally gave up after running out of ammunition. Ahmed Asaf: The only commander who escaped. He continued fighting until the last moment, then broke out during the chaos. He later posted on Facebook: “I will never surrender; I’d rather be a free hawk than a chained slave.” Casualties Officially, Asayish reported 3 security personnel killed and 19 injured. Unofficially, around 30 fighters from Lahur’s side were killed or injured, including six of his personal guards. Fate of Lahur Sheikh Jangi After capture, Lahur was transferred directly to the Asayish prison. Polad, shot in the leg, was hospitalized. Other detainees were moved to Kani Goma prison. Zino Mohammed and Fink Ahmed were later released. Initially, charges were under Article 56 of Iraqi law (conspiracy to disturb public security). Later, it shifted to Article 406 (premeditated murder), tied to the deaths of security officers. Bafel Talabani insists Lahur must be tried because: He allegedly attempted a coup. He fought against official security forces. Security officers were killed. But the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) clarified that the operation was conducted by PUK party forces, not official government security forces, and that the cabinet was not informed until after it started. UK Citizenship Both Lahur and Polad hold British passports. The UK government has raised concerns with Bafel Talabani. Some discussions considered allowing Lahur and Polad to leave politics and resettle in the UK. But current indications point toward trial and sentencing in Kurdistan.

Three Party Leaders in Prison in Sulaymaniyah

According to reports, three party leaders (Lahur Sheikh Jangi, leader of Berêy Gel; Shaswar Abdulwahid, leader of New Generation; and Aram Qadir, former leader of Hawpaimani) are currently imprisoned in Sulaymaniyah. 1. Lahur Sheikh Jangi – Leader of Berêy Gel Lahur Sheikh Jangi, leader of Berêy Gel, who holds 2 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, was arrested today after security forces took control of the party’s main headquarters in Lalazar. He is now being held in the Kani Goma prison and is set to face trial under Article 406 of the Iraqi Penal Code. 2. Shaswar Abdulwahid – Leader of the New Generation Movement On August 12, 2025, by a judge’s ruling, Shaswar Abdulwahid, leader of the New Generation Movement, who holds 15 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament and 9 seats in the Iraqi Parliament, was arrested. He was previously sentenced in absentia to six months in prison, and on Thursday, he was brought before the court. His trial is scheduled for August 28. Currently, he is being held in the Police Detention & Transfer Facility in Salam Camp. 3. Aram Qadir – Former Leader of the National Alliance (Hawpaimani) On July 10, 2025, Aram Qadir, former leader of the Hawpaimani (National Alliance), was arrested in Sulaymaniyah. However, the reason for his arrest remains unknown, and it is not clear where he is being held.

Clashes End, Security Forces Take Control of Lalezar

Last night, large units of Counter-Terrorism, Commando, and SWAT forces surrounded the residence of Lahur Sheikh Jangi, head of the "Berêy Gel" faction, in Sarchnar, Sulaimani. The Sulaimani court spokesperson announced that an arrest warrant was issued for Lahur Sheikh Jangi under Article 56, which concerns groups conspiring to undermine security and stability. At around 3:30 a.m. this morning, clashes erupted between the two sides. Using heavy weapons, tanks, and various arms, the forces attacked Lalezar, where nearly 200 armed men loyal to Lahur Sheikh Jangi resisted for about three hours. By 6:30 a.m., the security forces entered Lalezar, arresting Lahur Sheikh Jangi, Polad Sheikh Jangi, and Aso Sheikh Jangi, bringing the fighting to an end. During the confrontation, three security personnel were killed and several others were injured.

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