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Oil Pipeline Ready for Export

Employees of the North Oil Company in Zakho are awaiting the resumption of Kurdistan Region oil exports. According to Fuad Hussein, a temporary agreement has been reached for handing over the Kurdistan Region's oil. Following the agreement, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil is now waiting to receive oil from the Kurdistan Region. Based on (Dwar)’s follow-up, employees of the North Oil Company — which belongs to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil — are stationed in Zakho waiting for the restart of Kurdistan Region oil exports. The decision is that Kurdistan’s oil will flow through the pipeline from the Khurmala field to Zakho, where it will be delivered to the Measurement Station (MS) managed by the North Oil Company under Iraq’s Ministry of Oil. At this station, the oil will be measured before being pumped toward Turkey. Inside Turkish territory, the oil is received at PS 1 station, from where it is transferred to Ceyhan Port and handed over to SOMO (Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company) for export. According to a statement by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Natural Resources released on August 13, the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil have agreed on a mechanism for resuming oil exports. The agreement was formally signed by 23 representatives — 17 of them from Iraq’s Ministry of Oil. Under the deal, after 50,000 barrels per day are reserved for domestic use in the Kurdistan Region, the remainder of the oil will be delivered to SOMO for export. Fuad Hussein, Iraq’s Foreign Minister and member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Political Bureau, told Al-Shams TV: “Erbil and Baghdad have reached a ‘temporary’ agreement on handing over the Kurdistan Region’s oil. This is only a temporary solution until the end of this year. It is based on two legal foundations: the current federal budget law and the rulings of the Federal Court. Therefore, starting next year, another, more permanent solution must be found.” Regarding why exports haven’t resumed yet and the current obstacles, Iraqi economic expert Nabil Marsoumi wrote on social media: International oil companies are still insisting on increasing the compensation for production costs, and Turkey has not yet formally confirmed its readiness to restart flows. Marsoumi highlighted two main obstacles to restarting Kurdistan Region oil exports: Consent of international oil companies: These companies are still demanding higher compensation for production costs. They are unwilling to accept a $16-per-barrel transport cost for exports. They have also raised the cost of trucking oil from the fields to the pipeline, estimated at 200–300 km. Furthermore, they want Baghdad to honor their commercial contracts, guarantee payment for past and future exports, ensure timely transfers of oil-sale revenues directly to the companies, and sign a written agreement with them. Turkey’s approval: Although Turkey had previously agreed in principle to receive the oil, it must issue an official notice to Iraq confirming its readiness to restart the pipeline flows. Once that happens, the oil will be loaded into tankers at Ceyhan Port, and SOMO will take charge of exporting it.

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PUK and KDP Have Not Yet Agreed on the Posts

So far, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have not reached an agreement on the division of government posts, and no positions have been allocated between them. They have only agreed to intensify efforts to ensure that the Kurdistan Parliament begins its work and activities in September. They have also reached an understanding on parliamentary posts. Yesterday, at the PUK Political Bureau headquarters in Erbil, delegations from the KDP and PUK met to discuss forming the new cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The statement issued after the meeting said both sides agreed that serious and intensive efforts should be made to ensure that the sixth term of the Kurdistan Parliament begins its legislative and regular activities in September, and that steps to form the new cabinet continue. According to Dawar’s sources from KDP and PUK officials, the two sides have not yet agreed on the distribution of posts and have not allocated any positions. The KDP has not accepted part of the PUK’s demands, and the PUK has likewise not agreed to the KDP’s proposals on the division of posts. Regarding yesterday’s statement, it was only mentioned that efforts should be intensified for the Parliament to convene in September, not that there was an agreement for the Parliament to start sessions. Since the KDP and PUK have not yet agreed on the division of posts — including parliamentary positions — it remains unclear how parliamentary activities will begin. This may be due to the continued pressure from the international community, which repeatedly calls for speeding up the formation of the new KRG cabinet. In recent meetings between top government, KDP, and PUK leaders with ambassadors and consuls, they have stressed the importance of forming the new cabinet before the Iraqi parliamentary elections. On the KDP–PUK Negotiations: Although the two parties have agreed on the government’s program and agenda — and publicly announced their agreement in February — the division of posts remains unresolved. Negotiations are ongoing, with each side maintaining its own demands and rejecting some of the other’s proposals. The posts the KDP has claimed for itself: President of the Kurdistan Region Prime Minister of the KRG President of the Kurdistan Judicial Council Deputy Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Minister of Interior Minister of Natural Resources Minister of Electricity Minister of Education Minister of Municipalities Head of the Council of Ministers’ Diwan The posts the KDP has proposed for the PUK: Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Vice President of the Kurdistan Region Deputy Prime Minister of the KRG Minister of Finance Minister of Higher Education Minister of Planning Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Minister of Reconstruction Minister of Agriculture Minister of Trade Minister of Peshmerga Affairs The PUK’s current demands: President of the Kurdistan Region Or a two-year term split for the Presidency and Premiership Minister of Interior Minister of Natural Resources Minister of Agriculture Minister of Finance Minister of Higher Education Minister of Agriculture (listed twice in their demands) Minister of Planning Secretary of the Council of Ministers According to Dawar’s findings, the negotiations are still far from an agreement on dividing the posts. Both sides have rejected several of each other’s proposals and continue to present new demands. Timeline and legal framework for forming the new cabinet: KDP and PUK officials, in their meetings with foreign diplomats and UN representatives, have emphasized that the new cabinet should be formed before the Iraqi parliamentary elections. Forming the government after the elections is considered too late, as time is running short. According to Law No. (1) of 2019 on the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, Article (4), Paragraph 1, after the election of the Parliament’s Presidency Board, the procedures for electing the President of the Region must begin within 30 days. This means the election and swearing-in of the Kurdistan Region’s President will take about 30 days. According to Articles (3) and (4) of Clause (56) of the 1992 Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Law, the President of the Executive Authority (Prime Minister) and the cabinet must be nominated and approved by the Kurdistan Parliament. Furthermore, according to Paragraph (12) of Article (10) of the amended Law No. (1) of 2005 on the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, after nomination by Parliament, the candidate for Prime Minister must be tasked with forming the cabinet within a period not exceeding 30 days. In other words, naming, assigning, and swearing in the new cabinet will also take 30 days. If the Parliament’s Presidency Board is formed in mid-September, the process of electing and swearing in the President, then forming and swearing in the new cabinet, would take around 60 days — putting the completion of the process in mid-November, about a week after the Iraqi Council of Representatives elections. This timeline assumes the KDP and PUK reach full agreement on all posts with no further disputes.

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ShaMaran in the Atrush and Sarsang Fields in the First Half of 2025

🔻 According to the press release of Canadian ShaMaran Petroleum Company for the first half of 2025: 🔹 The company’s total revenue in the first half of 2025 amounted to $71.27 million, while in the first half of 2024 it was $45.218 million. Accordingly, revenue increased by $26.052 million, or 58%. 🔹 The combined average daily production from both the Atrush and Sarsang fields in the first half of 2025 was 64,500 barrels of oil per day (bopd), compared to 56,100 bopd in the first half of 2024. This represents an increase of 8,400 bopd, or 15%. In the first half of this year, Atrush’s average daily production was 35,200 bopd and Sarsang’s was 29,300 bopd, whereas in the first half of 2024, Atrush averaged 22,500 bopd and Sarsang 33,600 bopd. 🔹 The Atrush block has not been affected by any drone attack impacts and has resumed full-capacity production, but in the Sarsang block, production restarted at a reduced rate due to damage sustained. Current assessments indicate that about half of Sarsang’s production capacity will remain offline until the end of October 2025. ShaMaran Petroleum Company Revenue in the First Half of 2025 According to ShaMaran Petroleum Company’s press release: The company’s total revenue in Q2 2025 amounted to $35.385 million, compared to $22.630 million in Q2 2024. This means Q2 2025 revenue increased by $12.755 million, or 56%, compared to the same period last year. Meanwhile, the company’s total revenue in the first half of 2025 was $71.27 million, compared to $45.218 million in the first half of 2024—an increase of $26.052 million, or 58%. Oil Production from the Sarsang and Atrush Fields in the First Half of 2025 ShaMaran Petroleum, which has stakes in both the Sarsang and Atrush oil fields, announced: The combined average daily production from the two fields in the first half of 2025 was 64,500 bopd, compared to 56,100 bopd in the first half of 2024, an increase of 8,400 bopd or 15%. In the first half of this year, Atrush produced an average of 35,200 bopd and Sarsang 29,300 bopd. In the first half of 2024, Atrush averaged 22,500 bopd and Sarsang 33,600 bopd. The company also revealed that on July 15, 2025, ShaMaran was informed by HKN Energy Ltd. (“HKN”), the operator of the Sarsang block, that production had been halted following an explosion at one of the facilities due to a suspected unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike. No casualties occurred, but three storage tanks and associated pipelines were damaged. Although no incident occurred in the Atrush block and there were no further UAV strikes on Sarsang, production in both blocks was temporarily shut down as a precautionary measure following similar incidents at other fields in the Kurdistan Region. HKN resumed production in both blocks once the situation stabilized and was deemed safe after consultations with the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Atrush block was unaffected and returned to full capacity production. However, in the Sarsang block, production restarted at a reduced rate due to the sustained damage, and current assessments indicate that approximately half of Sarsang’s production capacity will remain offline until late October 2025. Source: ShaMaran Reports Second Quarter 2025 Results, August 6, 2025 https://shamaranpetroleum.com/news/shamaran-reports-second-quarter-2025-results-122873/

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Sulaimaniyah Police: "​​​​​​​Shaswar Abdulwahid has been sentenced in absentia and will be brought before the court."

Shaswar Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation Movement, has been arrested. According to the New Generation Movement, he was detained by a force belonging to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and taken to an unknown location. Surah Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation parliamentary bloc in the Iraqi Parliament, stated: a PUK force detained Shaswar Abdulwahid, acting on orders from Bafel Talabani and in coordination with Masrour Barzani. She claimed they fear Shaswar Abdulwahid’s stance and the elections, which is why they arrested him. A police spokesperson in Sulaimaniyah said that Shaswar Abdulwahid was arrested by Sulaimaniyah police and will be brought before a judge tomorrow. According to a statement from the Sulaimaniyah court, on 3 August 2025, Shaswar Abdulwahid was sentenced to six months in prison. The court ordered his arrest. Another statement, based on a complaint from a Sulaimaniyah security official, confirms there is an arrest warrant against him. Additionally, according to a complaint from former MP Shadi Newzad, he was sentenced to prison on charges of making threats, and the court requested his arrest. According to Dreaw’s follow-up with the court, Shaswar Abdulwahid had several complaints filed against him and had been notified, but he failed to appear before the court. Therefore, he was sentenced in absentia on three charges, totaling approximately three years and six months in prison. He will be brought before a judge but must serve his sentence before being released. In a video recording made before his arrest (and released after), Shaswar Abdulwahid says: "Through some people, I learned there was an attempt to arrest me. What they want from me is because of one thing: I speak out. They told us, ‘Yes, you said they are thieves.’ When this video is released, I won’t know if I’ve been arrested, disappeared, or killed. Their goal in arresting me is threefold: First, to stop me from managing the election campaign; second, to pressure me into surrendering; third, the PUK and KDP have agreed and are forming a government—they want to completely destroy my political movement. I say this before God Almighty: they want to silence me, but I won’t do it. Whatever happens to me, even if they kill me in prison, don’t stay silent. If what they say is true and they have any charges against me, let them try me in public court. If they have even a shred of honor and morality, and the courage, they should bring me openly before the people and try me in public."

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Production within the framework of Genel Energy’s contracts

  🔻 According to the latest report from the Turkish company Genel Energy for the first half of 2025, in all the oil fields in the Kurdistan Region in which the company has stakes, production levels were as follows: Tawke PSC area: In the first half of this year, average daily oil production reached 78,400 barrels per day (bpd). In Q1 2025, the average was 82,081 bpd, but in Q2 it dropped by 7,321 bpd (a 9% decline) to 74,760 bpd. Oil price: The company sold each barrel of oil at an average of $33 during the first half of this year, while the average Brent crude price in the same period was $72 per barrel. Revenue: The company’s revenue in H1 2025 amounted to $35.8 million, compared to $37.6 million in H1 2024. The report also stated that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) approved Genel Energy’s exit from the Sarta, Qara Dagh, and Taq Taq licenses, with minimal post-exit obligations. Revenue and production in H1 2025 According to the latest report, in the Tawke oil field in particular, average daily production was 78,400 bpd, down from 82,081 bpd in Q1 to 74,760 bpd in Q2 (a 9% drop). Revenue in H1 2025 was $35.8 million, compared to $37.6 million in H1 2024. Each barrel was sold at an average of $33, while Brent crude averaged $72. After the end of H1 2025, an unmanned drone attack targeted several Kurdistan Region oil fields, including Tawke, causing temporary production halts due to damage. The company stated that after assessing the damage, they are working on an appropriate plan to restore production levels. The report also mentioned that following exits from the Sarta, Qara Dagh, and Taq Taq licenses approved by the KRG, both receivables and costs owed to and from the KRG were reduced. The net receivables stood at around $50 million. Status of Taq Taq and Sarta fields Both Taq Taq and Sarta fields, operated by Genel Energy, have not produced oil since the suspension of Kurdistan’s oil exports on 25 March 2023, following a ruling by the Paris-based International Court of Arbitration. Only the Tawke field remains in production. Genel Energy’s fields in the Kurdistan Region The KRG has contracts with the Turkish company Genel Energy in four oil fields — Tawke, Taq Taq, Sarta, and Qara Dagh. The first three were producing before the export halt in March 2023, but only Tawke is still active. Tawke Field – Located in Duhok province. Norwegian company DNO holds 75%, while Genel Energy holds 25% of the PSC. Taq Taq Field – Located in the Taq Taq subdistrict of Koya, covering 951 km². Shares: Addax Petroleum (36%), Genel Energy (44%), and KRG’s KEPCO (20%). Genel Energy’s exit from Taq Taq has been approved by the KRG. Sarta Field – Located in Erbil province. Shares: Genel Energy (30%) and KEPCO (20%). Exit approved by the KRG. Qara Dagh Field – Located in Sulaymaniyah province, covering 846 km². Previously held by ExxonMobil (80%) and KEPCO (20%). After Exxon’s withdrawal, Genel Energy acquired 40%, but no production has begun. Exit from Qara Dagh has also been approved by the KRG. Source: Genel Energy PLC: Unaudited results for the period ended 30 June 2025, 05/08/2025 https://genelenergy.com/regulatory-news-press-releases/

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The Fate of Kurdistan Region’s Oil Between Ceyhan and Baniyas

As Turkey increases pressure on Iraq to export oil through the Ceyhan pipeline at full capacity, the Baghdad government has entered into talks with Syria to revive the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline—a line that has been out of service since the 1980s. It is expected that negotiations over its reactivation will be challenging for both countries. Will Kirkuk oil be sent to Syria? This report examines the fate of Kurdistan’s oil between the ports of Ceyhan and Baniyas.   A Discreet Visit Syrian Minister of Oil, Mohammad Bashir, visited Baghdad and met with Iraq’s Oil Minister, Hayyan Abdul Ghani. According to Syria’s state news agency (SANA), the Syrian minister stated during the meeting that Syria imports approximately 3 million barrels of oil per month to meet its domestic needs, in addition to its limited production. The visit was kept low-profile and was organized at the invitation of Iraq’s Oil Minister.   The Baniyas Pipeline — An Old Effort The Syrian minister stressed the importance of restoring the oil pipeline between Iraq and Syria, saying: “The old Kirkuk–Baniyas line has completely aged and needs a comprehensive technical review.” Iraq’s Oil Minister, Hayyan Abdul Ghani, expressed interest in reactivating the Iraq–Syria crude pipeline. He proposed assigning a specialized consultant to assess the current condition of the line and explore the possibility of either restoring it or building a new one. Abdul Ghani added that recent regional events — including the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, and the risk of maritime shipping disruptions — could impact Iraq’s oil exports, making alternative export routes a strategic necessity. The idea of reviving the Kirkuk–Baniyas line first resurfaced in October 2023, when Bashar al-Assad was still in control of Syria. With Iranian backing, Iraq began to discuss reopening the line. At that time, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil even sent technical teams to rehabilitate parts of the Kirkuk–Baiji–Haditha route (about 300 km), with plans to negotiate with Syria to restore the remaining sections damaged by war and unrest. Earlier reports suggested Iran was seeking to use this pipeline as an alternative export route to bypass U.S. sanctions, since the Kirkuk–Baniyas route passes through areas controlled by Iranian allies (Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces and the Assad regime). However, the political landscape has since changed: Syria remains under Iranian influence, but inside Iraq, the PMF faces heavy U.S. pressure.   Can the Baniyas Line Be Revived? Ghiyath Diab, Syria’s Deputy Oil Minister for Affairs, said during the meeting: “The pumping stations along the pipeline are near collapse and require full renovation — including replacing pipes, tanks, pumps, and electrical and mechanical infrastructure.” He also mentioned a parallel project to lay a fiber-optic telecommunications cable along the same route, linking Syria to Lebanon. The two ministers agreed to assign a joint technical and advisory team to assess the current situation and to form a high-level committee, chaired by Syria’s Oil Minister, to coordinate projects between the two countries. The key question now is whether Iraq can simultaneously restart both the Iraq–Turkey (Ceyhan) line and the Iraq–Syria (Baniyas) line, especially as Baghdad seeks alternative export options beyond its southern ports.   Financial and Political Obstacles According to Eco Iraq, a specialized economic think tank, rehabilitating the Kirkuk–Baniyas line could cost between $400–600 million. Both Iraq and Syria are financially strained and cannot afford such a project alone. The organization suggests the best solution is to build a new, higher-capacity line through a partnership with a third country that can provide both technical expertise and financing. Economic expert Nabil Marsoumi, from oil-rich Basra province, is skeptical about the project. He notes Iraq’s poor history with oil pipelines: Syria shut this line in 1982; later, Saudi Arabia closed its pipeline; and more recently, Turkey shut the Ceyhan line. In all these cases, Iraq suffered major losses. Marsoumi warns that if Syria rebuilds the line now, there is no guarantee it won’t shut it again in the future. In 2007, Iraq and Syria agreed to rebuild the Kirkuk–Baniyas line through a company affiliated with Russia’s Gazprom, but the agreement collapsed in 2009 due to rising costs and other disputes — a precedent that raises doubts about the current plan.   Strategic Leverage on Turkey Some analysts see the Syrian minister’s visit and discussion of the Kirkuk–Baniyas revival as a way for Baghdad to pressure Turkey, especially as Ankara recently ended its crude export deal with Iraq via Ceyhan. Turkey has made it clear that it will only extend the pipeline’s lifespan if Iraq supplies it at full capacity — more than 1 million barrels per day. This pipeline has been idle since March 25, 2023, when Turkey halted Kurdistan oil exports after an international arbitration ruling in favor of Baghdad. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), relying on an “independent oil policy” since 2014, had been exporting its own crude through Ceyhan until the court case forced a halt. Baghdad now appears determined that, if the KRG hands over its oil to Iraq’s SOMO, future exports will be routed through Kirkuk — whether via the Kirkuk–Ceyhan line or, in the longer term, through the Kirkuk–Baniyas line.   About the Kirkuk–Baniyas Line The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline was one of Iraq’s most important oil export projects in the mid-20th century. Built in 1934 and stretching over 800 km, the first pipeline was 12 inches wide and could carry 85,000 barrels per day. Later expansions in the 1950s and 1970s increased capacity with additional 30- and 32-inch lines. In 1982, Iraq stopped sending crude via Syria due to Damascus’s support for Iran during the Iran–Iran-Iraq War. The line connected Kirkuk’s oil fields to Syria’s Baniyas port on the Mediterranean, giving Iraq a strategic route to European markets. Large sections of the pipeline inside Syria have been damaged due to the war. On the Iraqi side, the line from Kirkuk to Baiji (120 km) is still functional, capable of moving 600,000 bpd, but from Baiji to Haditha (200 km) it narrows to 30–32 inches, limiting capacity to 150,000 bpd. Experts say it would need to be upgraded to 40–42 inches to match the 600,000 bpd capacity.  

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Production and Revenues of the Tawke Oil Field in the First 6 Months of 2025

Report by: Runbin In the first half of 2025, a total of 12,311,833 barrels of oil were produced in the Tawke Production Sharing Contract (PSC) area (Tawke–Peshkabir). The average selling price per barrel was $33 in the domestic market. The total revenue from the field amounted to $472,290,473. Out of this amount, Genel Energy and DNO earned $142,112,000 as profit and cost recovery. The amount left for the government in the first half of 2025 was $330,178,000. In a webinar attended by Runbin on the morning of Wednesday, August 6, 2025, Genel Energy released its Kurdistan Region activity report for the first half of 2025. Genel Energy’s CEO, Paul Weir, and CFO, Luke Clements, delivered the presentation. The company currently operates only in the Tawke PSC area in Kurdistan. Paul stated: “The Tawke PSC has delivered strong production performance, meeting ongoing domestic demand in the first half of 2025. Along with reduced expenditure compared to 2024, this has created strong free cash flow.” He also said: “We currently have a cash balance of $225 million. This strong financial position allows us to maintain liquidity, invest in new production capacity, and diversify geographically, in line with our strategy.” Paul noted that in July, oil operations of several international oil companies in the Kurdistan Region were targeted by drone attacks, and Tawke was among the sites affected. “We are pleased to confirm there were no human casualties. However, recent events in the Middle East have heightened security awareness in Kurdistan. We have reduced on-site staff to the minimum necessary. The operational impact of the attacks is still being assessed, and future production plans will be adjusted accordingly. At the same time, we are continuing to assess damage, reduce site staff, strengthen safety protocols, and implement necessary repairs for a full production restart.” The CEO added: “We expect the financial impact of these damages and production delays to be limited, thanks to ongoing cost control and insurance coverage for such incidents. We continue to provide guidance that no material change to our year-end cash outlook is expected.” In the webinar, Luke commented on the challenging political situation in Iraq and the uncertainty over when the Iraq–Turkey export pipeline will reopen or when a comprehensive agreement will be reached. “What we and other international oil companies want is clear: a written guarantee that our contractual rights under the ‘Production Sharing Contract’ will be protected, and that our entitlements will be honored as agreed. The current agreed cost recovery price per barrel is $16, although the actual cost per barrel is higher.” In response to a question submitted earlier by Runbin regarding damages and current production levels at Tawke, Paul said: “Due to the drone attacks, a small storage tank at Tawke was completely destroyed and will not be repaired. One production unit at Peshkabir was also damaged. The production impact is minor, but production at the field has been halted since the attacks. Regarding compensation for these damages, we have insurance and are in discussions with the insurer to finalize claims, which will cover both physical damage and lost production for the affected period. At this stage, we cannot say more as talks are ongoing.” Production Levels at Tawke Field Genel Energy owns a 25% stake in the Tawke PSC area (Tawke and Peshkabir fields), while DNO holds 75%. Tawke is the second-largest oil field in the Kurdistan Region after Khurmala. In Q1 2025, average production from the PSC area was 82,081 barrels/day, while in Q2 2025 production fell to 74,760 barrels/day, resulting in a first-half average of 78,421 barrels/day. Genel’s share was 19,605 barrels/day, and DNO’s share was 58,815 barrels/day. The Q2 decline was partly due to a 12-day shutdown caused by the Iran–Israel conflict. The average domestic selling price for Tawke oil was $33/bbl, compared to the global Brent benchmark price of $72/bbl, a discount of $39, meaning the price was less than 54% of Brent. In H1 2024, the domestic price averaged $34/bbl, and the full-year 2024 average was $35/bbl. The operating expense (Opex) per barrel was less than $4. Runbin’s Breakdown According to Runbin, in H1 2025 a total of 14,311,833 barrels of oil were produced in the Tawke PSC area (Tawke–Peshkabir), sold domestically at an average price of $33/bbl, generating $472,290,473 in total revenue. Genel Energy earned $35,846,000 in profit and cost recovery, while DNO earned $106,265,000. The amount left for the government was $330,178,000 in the first half of 2025. Overview of the Tawke PSC Area The Tawke PSC is located in Dohuk province in the Kurdistan Region and includes the Tawke and Peshkabir oil fields. DNO (Norway) owns 75%, and Genel Energy (Turkey) owns 25%. The PSC was first signed with DNO in 2004. Tawke production began in 2007, and Peshkabir production in 2017. Average daily production in 2025 is around 80,000 barrels/day. From 2006 to the present, the Tawke PSC area has produced a total of 83 million barrels (68 million from Tawke and 15 million from Peshkabir). Currently, 52 million barrels remain producible. In 2015, a 44 km pipeline to Peshkabir was completed, along with two new production facilities, raising total processing capacity from 120,000 to 200,000 barrels/day. In 2015, production reached its peak at 186,000 barrels/day following the drilling of 10 new wells, doubling output. The annual average in 2015 was 144,490 barrels/day, but production has since been in steady decline. Tawke is considered a mature field, having produced 65.38% of its recoverable reserves. Based on economic assumptions, production is expected to continue until 2043, when the field will no longer be economically viable.

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Expenditures of Iraq’s Institutions and Ministries (2019–2024)

🔻 According to a review of the Iraqi government’s spending data from 2019 to 2024: 🔹 In 2024, the total salary expenditure of Iraqi government institutions will increase by 27%, reaching for the first time a massive 60 trillion Iraqi dinars, making up 40% of the government's total expenditures. This salary expenditure has reached a dangerous level, posing a catastrophic threat to Iraq’s economic condition. 🔹 Only seven government institutions account for nearly 93% of the central government's total salary spending. 🔹 The Ministry of Interior ranks first, taking 22% of the 2024 salary budget, with expenditures nearing 13 trillion dinars. 🔹 The Ministry of Education makes up 18% of the salary budget. Between 2019 and 2024, its allocated salary budget increased by 513%—from 1.74 trillion to 10.7 trillion dinars. 🔹 Salaries for employees in the Kurdistan Region increased from 4.58 trillion dinars in 2019 to 9.2 trillion dinars in 2024. This now constitutes 15.3% of the central government's salary budget, with a growth rate of 101%. Salary Expenditures (2019–2024) In 2024, the total salary expenditure of Iraqi government institutions will increase by 27%, reaching 60 trillion Iraqi dinars for the first time—representing 40% of Iraq’s total government expenditures. This represents a perilous threshold, with dire economic implications. In 2019, the government’s salary expenditures were 40 trillion dinars. By 2024, they will have reached 60 trillion dinars, reflecting a 50% increase over five years—without any significant increase in oil revenue or improvements in public services. (See Table 1 for more details.) Spending Distribution According to the same data review, seven governmental institutions alone account for nearly 93% of the central government’s salary expenditures, indicating a severe concentration in budget allocation. Leading the list is the Ministry of Interior, taking 22% of the 2024 salary budget, with nearly 13 trillion dinars in expenditures—up from 10.5 trillion dinars in 2019. Next is the Ministry of Education, which consumes 18% of the salary budget. Its budget jumped from 1.74 trillion dinars in 2019 to 10.7 trillion dinars in 2024—a 513% increase, the highest among all ministries. The salary expenditures for Kurdistan Region employees increased from 4.58 trillion dinars in 2019 to 9.2 trillion dinars in 2024. This accounts for 15.3% of the total salary budget, representing a 101% increase. Following them is the Ministry of Health, with a notable 466% increase, going from approximately 1 trillion dinars in 2019 to 5.9 trillion dinars in 2024. The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and its affiliated entities increased their salary budget by 80%, from 3.5 trillion to 6.34 trillion dinars, during the same period. In contrast, the remaining ministries and governorates account for only 6.5% of the central government’s salary expenditures. It should be noted that these figures do not include ministries and departments with self-financing mechanisms—such as the Ministries of Electricity, Oil, and Communications. The total increase in central government salary spending between 2019 and 2024 is approximately 48%. This sharp rise imposes a heavy burden on future governments, especially due to its direct impact on the sustainability of public spending and the country’s financial resources.

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The biggest gap between paychecks in the Kurdistan Region

For nearly a season, spanning the months of May, June, and July, public sector employees in the Kurdistan Region have not received their salaries. This marks the longest period without pay in the history of the Kurdistan Regional Government's cabinets, at least since the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the participation of the Kurds in the Iraqi political process. The monthly payroll for public employees in the Kurdistan Region amounts to (958) billion dinars, totaling (2 trillion and 874 billion) dinars for the three months. Currently, the Kurdistan Regional Government is solely looking to Baghdad to cover these salaries, despite the region having several other sources of income. Internal Revenue: According to statements from officials at the Ministry of Finance, this amounts to (320 billion) dinars monthly, which totals (960 billion) dinars for the three months. KRG Oil Revenue: According to a report by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, this is approximately (400 billion) dinars per month, totaling (1 trillion and 200 billion) dinars for the three months. Coalition Funds: These amount to (20 billion) dinars monthly, adding up to (60 billion) dinars over the three months. Baghdad is scheduled to disburse the salaries for May, but employees are not optimistic that the agreement between Erbil and Baghdad will resolve the salary crisis. According to a poll conducted by (Draw Media) on Facebook, 94% of participants do not believe the salary issue has been resolved and think that, despite the decision to pay May's salaries, the problem will continue. As it stands, the Kurdistan Regional Government's only hope for distributing salaries lies with funds from the central government in Baghdad.

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Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces: Growing Numbers and a Multi-Billion Dollar Budget

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi, a powerful paramilitary umbrella organization in Iraq, has seen a significant increase in its number of fighters and its budget in recent years. As of 2024, the force boasts a membership of over 238,000, a substantial jump from approximately 60,000 in 2014, and its budget has swelled to an estimated $2.9 billion. This growth underscores the PMF's expanding influence within Iraq's security and political landscape. Formation and Legal Status The PMF was formed in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's highest Shia religious authority, calling for volunteers to fight against the Islamic State (IS) group. Initially a collection of volunteer militias, the PMF was officially recognized by the Iraqi parliament in 2016, integrating it into the state's security apparatus and placing it under the formal command of the prime minister. Despite this, many of its factions, particularly those with strong ties to Iran, operate with a degree of autonomy. Budget and Personnel Growth The PMF's budget has seen a steady and rapid increase. In 2019-2022, its general budget was $2.16 billion, which rose to $2.6 billion in 2023 and is projected to be around $2.9 billion in 2024. According to the 2024 budget tables, the allocation for PMF salaries increased from 3.5 trillion Iraqi dinars in 2023 to 3.9 trillion dinars in 2024, an 11.4% increase. The number of PMF members has also seen a dramatic rise. From around 60,000 volunteers in 2014, the force grew to over 122,000 by 2021. By the end of 2023, this number had jumped to 204,000 and now stands at 238,000 fighters, constituting approximately 16.5% of Iraq's total security and armed forces. Composition and Leadership The PMF is a diverse coalition, though predominantly Shia. It is estimated that Shia Muslims make up about 85% of the force, with the remaining 15% composed of Sunni Muslims. However, the leadership is overwhelmingly controlled by Shia figures. The PMF is chaired by Falih al-Fayyadh. The deputy head is Abdul-Aziz al-Mohammadawi, also known as Abu Fadak. Many of the most powerful groups within the PMF are backed by Iran. Key Brigades and Factions The PMF is composed of numerous brigades, often affiliated with specific political parties or religious authorities. Some of the most prominent include: Badr Organization: Led by Hadi al-Amiri, it is one of the oldest and most powerful factions, with 15 brigades. Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades): An influential group with strong ties to Iran, controlling several brigades. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous): Another influential Iran-aligned group that emerged from the Sadrist movement, with three brigades. Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades): Affiliated with the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, consisting of three brigades. Atabat Brigades: Forces affiliated with the holy shrines in Karbala and Najaf, generally seen as more loyal to the Iraqi state. Tribal Mobilization (Hashd al-Asha'iri): Comprised of Sunni tribal fighters who joined the fight against IS. Minority Brigades: Including Christian groups like the Babylon Brigades and Shabak forces from the Nineveh Plains.  

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Damage of Drone Attacks on Oil Fields in the Kurdistan Region

Five major oil fields in the Kurdistan Region — Sheikhan, Tawke, Peshkabour, Khurmala, and Sarsang — were targeted by drone attacks, halting around 50% of production, amounting to 145,000 barrels of oil per day. Sheikhan Field, producing over 35,000 barrels/day, was shut down. Tawke Field, producing 29,000 barrels/day, was hit and closed. Peshkabour, with over 50,000 barrels/day, also suffered damage. Sarsang, producing 30,000 barrels/day, was attacked on July 15, 2025, halting operations. Khurmala, the largest with over 100,000 barrels/day, was attacked twice, damaging water pipelines. These attacks severely impact Kurdistan’s oil sector — the backbone of its economy — and threaten regional security. Daily oil production has dropped from 280,000 to around 135,000 barrels. The perpetrators are unknown, though initial investigations hint at armed groups linked to foreign backers.

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Kurdistan Justice Group Holds its Fifth Congress

Today, in the city of Erbil, the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG) is holding its fifth congress, with over 900 members in attendance. The fifth congress of the Justice Group is a review congress of its past four years, as its seats and votes have decreased in the last two elections for the Kurdistan and Iraqi parliaments. The Kurdistan Justice Group This party was originally named the Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal). It was founded on May 31, 2001, after splitting from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. Since its establishment, it has been led by Ali Bapir, meaning its leader has not changed for 24 years. In February 2021, the Islamic Group held its (fourth) congress in Sulaymaniyah. In that congress, as the first Islamic party in the Kurdistan Region, it removed the "Islamic" suffix from its name, changing it from the Kurdistan Islamic Group to the Kurdistan Justice Group. In addition to this, the title of the party's top person was changed from "Emir" to "President." The Kurdistan Justice Group has held five congresses to date: First Congress: 10-11-12/11/2005 in Sulaymaniyah Second Congress: 15-16-17/ /2010 in Erbil (Translator's note: Month missing in original text) Third Congress: 30-31/5 and 1/6/2015 in Erbil Fourth Congress: 18-19/2/2021 in Sulaymaniyah Fifth Congress: 19-20/7/2025 in Erbil In the period between the last two congresses, the Justice Group's seats and votes have decreased. In the last election, its seats in the Kurdistan Parliament were reduced from 7 to 3 seats, and in the Iraqi Parliament, its seats were reduced from 2) seats to 1) seat. (Translator's note: The original text contained a typo stating a reduction to 19 seats, which is corrected here based on the subsequent data.) In the sixth session elections of the Kurdistan Parliament, the Kurdistan Justice Group obtained 64,864 votes and 3 seats, but the KJG leadership decided not to enter the Kurdistan Parliament, claiming the election was "designed." In the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections, the Kurdistan Justice Group obtained 64,156 votes and 1 seat. Kurdistan Justice Group's Position in Past Elections  

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The text of the agreement between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad

This agreement is effective until 31/12/2025. A new agreement will be required for the year 2026. First: The Oil File KRG will begin exporting all oil produced from the Region's fields, amounting to two hundred and thirty thousand (230,000) barrels per day, in addition to any future increases, through the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). The Federal Ministry of Finance will provide the Regional Government with $16 per barrel, in accordance with the amended Federal General Budget Law. A daily amount of 50,000 barrels will be allocated for domestic use in the Region, provided that the Regional Government commits to paying the production costs for this quantity. If the Region requires it, the Federal Ministry of Oil will allocate an amount of derivatives equivalent to the refining of 15,000 barrels. A joint committee from the Federal Ministry of Oil and the Regional Ministry of Natural Resources will assess the Region's actual need for oil derivatives for allocation purposes and will submit its report within two weeks. Second: The Non-Oil Revenue File The Regional Government will hand over an amount of 120 billion dinars for each of the months of May and June to the Federal Ministry of Finance. A working team from the Federal and Regional Boards of Supreme Audit will be formed to audit and classify non-oil revenues and determine the Federal Government's share thereof, within one month. The Ministry of Finance will immediately begin disbursing the salaries of the Region's employees for the months of May, June, and subsequent months.

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German Consul visited Draw Media, discussed oil, salaries, elections

The German Consul General in the Kurdistan Region visited Draw Media, where discussions focused on issues related to oil and salaries, elections, and freedom of expression. Albrecht von Wittke, the German Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, and Ihsan Walzi, Advisor for Political Affairs and Public Relations, visited Draw Media Organization to discuss the issue of freedom of expression and the current situation in the Kurdistan Region. Draw Media used data and graphics on oil production and revenues in the Kurdistan Region to highlight problems related to salaries and election challenges.

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​​​​​​​Sarsang... The Story of a Flared Gas Field

The Sarsang oil field, located in the Duhok Governorate, spans an area of 420 square kilometers and is divided into two separate oil zones: Swara Tuka and East Swara Tuka. Each contains three independent oil reservoirs. Estimates suggest the field holds 2 billion barrels of recoverable oil. The oil here is light and sweet, with a high API gravity and low sulfur content, making it compatible with Brent crude and requiring minimal refining. The operating expenditure (OPEX) for production is low, approximately $5.6 per barrel. On November 6, 2007, the Iraqi Ministry of Natural Resources awarded an exploration and production sharing contract (EPSC) to the American company HKN. Exploration began in 2008, and oil was discovered in 2011. According to a February 2014 report from the Ministry of Natural Resources, 213 workers were employed at the site by HKN at that time, with 173 of them being local, representing 81% local workforce participation. The field also contains natural gas, which has mostly been flared. In March 2022, Kamal Mohammed, then Minister of Electricity and acting Minister of Natural Resources, met with two foreign companies and requested studies on how to utilize the flared gas for power generation. This would both help solve electricity supply issues and protect the environment. Ownership shares in the Sarsang field currently stand as follows: 62% – HKN (U.S.) 18% – ShaMaran Petroleum (Canada), which purchased the French company Total's stake for $155 million in September 2022. 20% – Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) As of 2021, Total's share in the field was producing around 3,500 barrels per day. Field Capacity and Production Zones: 1. Swara Tuka (Main Zone): Contains 6 wells Production capacity: 29,000 barrels/day Oil quality: API 36–39 2. East Swara Tuka: Contains 1 well Production capacity: 2,500 barrels/day Oil quality: API 36–39 In June 2022, after a Federal Supreme Court ruling that invalidated the KRG’s oil and gas law, Iraq’s Oil Ministry increased pressure on international oil companies in the region. The American service company Schlumberger, which had been working with HKN in the Sarsang field since 2012, withdrew from Kurdistan. It had drilled 7 wells at the site and held contracts to drill 5 more to increase daily production to 50,000 barrels by 2023. Similarly, Baker Hughes, another U.S. oilfield services company, also withdrew during previous political tensions between Baghdad and Erbil. In March 2023, just before KRG crude exports to Turkey halted (March 25, 2023), Sarsang’s daily output had reached 43,000 barrels/day. After the halt, production dropped to 33,600 barrels/day. Recent Financials: In Q1 of 2024, ShaMaran Petroleum announced: Total revenue: $22.59 million Daily average production: 37,200 barrels Sales: 3.35 million barrels This sales volume exceeded pre-export shutdown levels. Historical Production Growth (2016–2024): 2016: 5,000 bpd 2017: 10,000 bpd 2018: 17,000 bpd 2019: 23,000 bpd 2020: 24,000 bpd 2021: 31,000 bpd 2022: 33,000 bpd 2023: 43,000 bpd (until exports halted in March) → then dropped to 33,600 bpd 2024: 37,000 bpd Sources: KRG Ministry of Natural Resources: https://archive.gov.krd/mnr/mnr.krg.org/index.php/en.html ShaMaran Petroleum: https://shamaranpetroleum.com/ HKN Energy: https://www.hknenergy.com/ Total's withdrawal: https://drawmedia.net/page_detail?smart-id=11071 Iraq Business News: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2022/06/29/schlumberger-withdraws-from-iraqi-kurdistan/ ATTAQA energy news: https://attaqa.net/...

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