Draw Media

News / Iraq

Iraq’s General Elections (2005–2023)

🔹 Iraq and its people are approaching their ninth general election since the regime change in 2003. After five parliamentary terms and three rounds of provincial council elections, the country is now heading toward the sixth parliamentary election, scheduled for November 2025. 🔹 Statistics show that voter turnout in Iraq has been declining after each election. For example, in the first parliamentary elections (January 2005), out of 15.5 million registered voters, 11.89 million participated — a turnout of 79%. But in the most recent parliamentary elections (2021), out of 22.1 million registered voters, only 9.6 million participated — 43.5% turnout. 🔹 Similarly, in the first provincial elections (2009), out of 14.6 million voters, 7.14 million voted (48% turnout). But in the most recent provincial council elections (2023), out of 16.2 million voters, only 5.6 million voted (41% turnout). Introduction Iraq is heading into its ninth general election since the 2003 regime change. After five parliamentary sessions and three provincial council elections, the sixth parliamentary election is scheduled for November 2025. Political and security changes, along with citizens’ disillusionment with Iraq’s political system, have significantly impacted election results and voter turnout. Yet, dominant political blocs have managed to maintain enough popular bases to secure influence in forming governments. This has intensified political competition and deepened divisions between factions. These elections were often marred by political and security crises that shaped their outcomes and government formation, while also fueling sectarian rivalries among Iraq’s political forces. Below is a summary of the eight major elections and trends in Iraqi voter behavior. 1. Parliamentary Election (2005) The first election after the U.S.-led invasion was tied to the demand for a new political system. Shiite voters, long excluded from power, mobilized strongly, while Kurds consolidated their influence. Many Sunni leaders boycotted, viewing the process as illegitimate. United Iraqi Alliance (led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim): ~128–140 seats (over 4 million votes). Kurdistan Alliance (KDP, PUK, others): 53 seats; Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats. Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni-led, Adnan al-Dulaimi): 44 seats. Iraqiya List (Iyad Allawi): 25 seats. Iraqi National Dialogue Front (Saleh al-Mutlaq): 11 seats. 2. Provincial Elections (2009) The first provincial elections were held (excluding Kurdistan and Kirkuk). They followed years of sectarian war (2006–07). State of Law Coalition (Nouri al-Maliki): 126 seats (~1.36m votes). Shahid al-Mihrab List (Abdul Aziz al-Hakim): 52 seats. Sadrist Trend: 43 seats. Iraqiya (Allawi): 26 seats. National Reform Trend (Ibrahim al-Jaafari): 23 seats. Sunni forces collectively: 78 seats (various leaders: Tareq al-Hashemi, Saleh al-Mutlaq, etc.). Kurdish parties: 20 seats. Other groups: 72 seats. This gave Maliki and his allies dominance, while Sunnis regained ground. 3. Parliamentary Election (2010) Marked by nationalist, cross-sectarian campaigning. Iraqiya List (Iyad Allawi): 91 seats (later reduced to 89). State of Law (Maliki): 89 seats. National Iraqi Alliance (ISCI, Sadrists, etc.): 70 seats. Kurdistan Alliance: 43 seats. Gorran Movement: 8 seats. Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats. Despite Allawi’s win, Maliki retained power through post-election alliances. 4. Provincial Elections (2013) Held amid protests, unrest, and security crackdowns under Maliki. State of Law: 102 seats (~1.9m votes). ISCI: 66 seats (~943k votes). Sadrist Trend: 60 seats (~653k votes). Mutahidun (al-Nujaifi): 35 seats. Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Dialogue Front: 18 seats. Kurdish List: 17 seats. Iyad Allawi’s List: 16 seats. Others: ~133 seats. 5. Parliamentary Election (2014) Held during the ISIS rise. Soon after, Mosul and other provinces fell. State of Law: 92 seats. Sadrist “Ahrar” Alliance: 33 seats. ISCI “Citizens’ Alliance”: 30 seats. Mutahidun (Sunni): 23 seats. National Coalition (Allawi): 21 seats. Kurds: 64 seats (KDP 27, PUK 21, Gorran 9, KIU 4, Komal 3). Despite his bloc’s win, Maliki was pushed aside; Haider al-Abadi became PM. 6. Parliamentary Election (2018) First after ISIS defeat. Sairoon Alliance (Sadristhe ts + allies): 54 seats. Fatah Alliance (Hadi al-Amiri): 47 seats. Nasr Alliance (Haider al-Abadi): 42 seats. State of Law: 25 seats. KDP: 26 seats. Wataniya (Allawi): 21 seats. Hikma (al-Hakim): 19 seats. PUK: 18 seats. Others: small blocs. 7. Parliamentary Election (2021) Snap elections following the 2019 October protests. Sadrist Movement: 73 seats. Progress Party (Taqaddum, Halbousi): 37 seats. KDP: 31 seats. State of Law (Maliki): 38 seats. Fatah Alliance (Amiri): 17 seats. Azm Alliance (Khanjar): 14 seats. Others: New Generation (9), independents, etc. After Sadrists withdrew, seats were redistributed, Coordination Framework bloc consolidated ~130 seats. 8. Provincial Elections (2023) First, since 2013, after the councils had been dissolved in 2019. Nabni (We Build, Amiri): 43 seats. State of Law (Maliki): 35 seats. State Forces Alliance (al-Hakim): 23 seats. Progress (Halbousi): 21 seats. Sovereignty Alliance: 14 seats. Decision (Tasmeem): 12 seats. Azm: 10 seats. Hasm National: 8 seats. KDP: 6 seats.

Next Sunday… New deadline for the State Council to decide

The State Council has postponed its opinion regarding the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad to the beginning of next week, in the hope that a representative of the Kurdistan Region will participate in the meeting. It appears that this council does not want, as the Federal Supreme Court has done in the past, to become entangled in the political disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad or be seen as taking sides when issuing decisions. Due to differences of opinion among the members of the State Council, the council was unable to finalize and submit its view on the Erbil-Baghdad disputes regarding Kurdistan’s oil revenues. Today marked the fourth consecutive day that the council failed to submit its opinion on this issue, which had been referred to it by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and the Federal Council of Ministers. The State Council has postponed giving its opinion on this key point of contention between Erbil and Baghdad until the beginning of next week (Sunday), so that the KRG’s representative might also participate in the meeting. It had originally been scheduled that on Tuesday of this week—coinciding with the regular meeting of the Federal Council of Ministers—the State Council would return its opinion to the federal government. On Monday, the council requested that two advisors from the KRG’s Ministries of Finance and Justice attend the session to help finalize the decision. However, so far, no representative of the KRG has participated in the council’s meetings, and it remains unclear whether one will attend on Sunday as expected. Yesterday, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers held a meeting about its disputes with the federal government over oil revenues. In its statement regarding the Federal Council of Ministers’ decision to refer the matter to the State Council, the KRG stressed: “We reaffirm our constitutional and legal position on the collection of oil revenues and the designation of shares in the federal treasury, based on Article (12/Second-d) and (21/Second) of the Federal Budget Law, and Article 29 of the Federal Financial Management Law, as well as Section Three of the Federal Supreme Court’s Decision No. 224 of 2024/2/21. All of these are legal and federal rulings, and in clear and explicit language they organize the collection of domestic revenues, earmark a share for the federal treasury, and also designate a share for the Kurdistan Region. This was also reaffirmed in the KRG’s latest official memorandum submitted to the federal government.” Because the State Council must give an opinion on the Erbil-Baghdad dispute over Kurdistan’s oil revenues, and since this is the first time the council is directly involved in a dispute between the two governments, it does not want to fall into the fate of the Federal Supreme Court, whose president was forced to resign due to political pressure. Instead, the council seeks to maintain neutrality in its decision-making and present itself as an impartial institution—especially at a time when Iraq is heading toward new elections and the outlook for the country’s future governance remains uncertain.

The Cost of Each Iraqi Parliament Session: 14 Billion Dinars

🔻 The Iraqi Council of Representatives over the past two decades: The first annual budget law was approved on 1/12/2005. The Iraqi Council of Representatives has issued 801 laws. Held 1,264 regular sessions and 22 extraordinary sessions. Questioned ministers and officials 23 times, hosted 227 ministers and prime ministers, withdrew confidence from 2 ministers, and dismissed 5 governors. The financial expenditure of the Fifth Parliamentary Term (from January 2022 to mid-2025) amounted to 1 trillion and 91 billion Iraqi dinars. During this period, the council held 134 sessions. By dividing total expenses by the number of sessions, it becomes clear that the cost of a single session exceeded 14 billion dinars. During these three years, each MP cost the public budget 5.1 billion dinars (excluding expenses for the second half of 2025). The Council of Representatives is Iraq’s main legislative authority. The current term consists of 329 members, representing the Iraqi people at a ratio of one seat per 100,000 citizens. Members are elected directly, secretly, and universally, representing the entirety of Iraq’s population. In the current term, MPs are organized into 27 committees with various responsibilities. The council is tasked with passing federal laws, overseeing the executive authority, electing the president, and ratifying international treaties and agreements according to the Constitution. This report provides an audit of the activities and financial expenditures of the Iraqi Parliament, linking legislative outcomes with budgetary spending. First: Legislative and Constitutional Activity of Iraq’s Legislative Authority (2004–2025) The National Assembly (100 members) was established through a national conference with more than 1,100 representatives of parties and political groups, presided over by Fuad Masum with four deputies. The first budget law was passed on 1/12/2005. Since then, the Council of Representatives has passed 801 laws. Held 1,264 regular sessions and 22 extraordinary sessions. Carried out 23 ministerial questionings, hosted 227 ministers and officials. Directed 34 oral questions to the government. Gave or withdrew confidence from multiple governments since 2006. Withdrew confidence from Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari and Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi (2014–2018). Dismissed five governors: Atheel al-Nujaifi (Nineveh), Najmaddin Karim (Kirkuk), Nofal al-Akoub (Nineveh), Ammar al-Jubouri (Salah al-Din), and Zuhair al-Ali (Diwaniyah). Ratified candidates for ambassadors, judges, heads of commissions, and senior state positions (e.g., Federal Supreme Court, Election Commission, Human Rights Commission). Second: Financial Costs of the Iraqi Parliament (2006–2025) 1. First Term (2006–2010): 275 MPs. Budget: 561 billion dinars over 4 years. Expenditures per MP: 334 million dinars (2006), 894 million (2007), ~1 trillion dinars total by 2008–2009. Employees increased from 315 to 788. 2. Second Term (2010–2014): 325 MPs. Budget: 1 trillion 308 billion dinars over 4 years. Annual allocations peaked in 2011 at 530 billion dinars. Staff rose from 788 to 1,807. 3. Third Term (2014–2018): 328 MPs. Budget: 961 billion dinars over 3 years. Annual allocations: 272 billion (2015), 314 billion (2016), 375 billion (2017). Staff rose to 1,947. 4. Fourth Term (2018–2021): Cut short due to protests (Tishreen Uprising). Budget: 1 trillion 786 billion dinars. Annual allocations: 372 billion (2018), 470 billion (2019), 448 billion (2020), 496 billion (2021). Cost per MP: 5.6 billion dinars. Staff rose to 2,223. 5. Fifth Term (2022–present): From Jan 2022 to mid-2025: 1 trillion 91 billion dinars spent. 134 sessions held. Cost per session: over 14 billion dinars. Cost per MP: 5.1 billion dinars so far (excluding the second half of 2025). Dr. Adel Hassan Dafar, Statistics of Constitutional Activities of Iraq’s Legislative Authorities (2004–2025), Iraqi Parliament Research Dept., July 2025. Data Journalism – Al-Saa Network, “Iraqi Parliament: Billion-Dinar Costs, Limited Legislative and Oversight Output,” 20 Aug 2025.

Marriage and Divorce in Iraq in the First Half of 2025

🔻 The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council publishes monthly statistics across the 15 governorates of Iraq regarding the number of marriages and divorces, based on the aggregate statistics released for the first six months of 2025. 🔹 In the first half of 2025, the total recorded number of marriages reached 171,846 cases. The highest percentage of marriages (18.3%) was recorded in February. The lowest marriage percentage was in March (13.4%), while Muthanna governorate recorded the lowest rate overall (2.5%). 🔹 During the same period, 34,522 divorce cases were recorded. The highest percentage (18.7%) was in January, while the highest share within a single court presidency was in Baghdad/Karkh (19.2%). The lowest divorce rate was in March (14.4%), while Muthanna governorate also recorded the lowest share overall (1.9%). Marriage and Divorce Statistics in Iraq’s 15 Governorates (First Half of 2025) According to the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council: 1. Marriages In the first half of 2025, 171,846 marriage cases were registered. The peak was in February (18.3%), and the lowest was in March (13.4%). Specifically: January 2025: 29,119 cases (16.9%). February 2025: 31,411 cases (18.3%) → the highest monthly figure. March 2025: 22,967 cases (13.4%) → the lowest monthly figure. April 2025: 28,853 cases (16.8%). May 2025: 31,274 cases (18.2%). June 2025: 28,222 cases (16.4%). 2. Divorces In the first half of 2025, 34,522 divorce cases were registered. The highest rate was in January (18.7%), and the lowest was in March (14.4%). Specifically: January 2025: 6,448 cases (18.7%) → the highest monthly figure. February 2025: 6,392 cases (18.5%). March 2025: 4,974 cases (14.4%) → the lowest monthly figure. April 2025: 5,665 cases (16.4%). May 2025: 6,015 cases (17.4%). June 2025: 5,028 cases (14.6%). Across Iraq’s governorates, with Baghdad divided between the Rusafa and Karkh personal status courts (in addition to 14 other governorates outside the Kurdistan Region) Baghdad/Rusafa Court recorded the highest marriage rates in the country. Baghdad/Karkh Court recorded the highest divorce rates compared to all other courts. Muthanna Governorate Court recorded the lowest marriage and divorce rates across Iraq.

Iraq’s Revenues and Expenditures for the First Five Months of 2025

The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has published two monthly reports outlining the country's revenues and expenditures for the first five months of 2025. Below is a summary based on those reports: 🔹 Total Revenue: As of the end of May 2025, Iraq's total public revenue (from both oil and non-oil sources) amounted to 46.157 trillion IQD, broken down as: Oil revenue: ~41.931 trillion IQD (91%) Non-oil revenue: ~4.226 trillion IQD (9%) 🔹 Total Expenditures: Total government expenditures (both operational and investment) exceeded 46.979 trillion IQD, comprising: Operational spending: ~94% Investment spending: ~6% 🔹 Transfers to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): The Ministry financed the KRG with over 5.167 trillion IQD in total during the five months, including: Salaries for employees: ~3.917 trillion IQD (75.8%) Relief & assistance: ~4.768 billion IQD (0.1%) Social welfare payments: ~1.245 trillion IQD (24.1%) 🔹 Budget Deficit: After subtracting total expenditures from revenues, Iraq recorded a budget shortfall of approximately 822.146 billion IQD, or 3% of total revenue. 🔹 Spending by the Three Presidencies: Combined spending of the three presidencies (Parliament, Presidency, Council of Ministers) reached 3.794 trillion IQD, including: Council of Representatives: ~214.710 billion IQD Presidency of the Republic: ~19.496 billion IQD Council of Ministers: ~3.533 trillion IQD 🔹 Investment Expenditures Breakdown: Investment (capital) spending—totaling ~3.028 trillion IQD—was distributed across key sectors: Agriculture: ~67.538 billion IQD (2%) Industry: ~635.521 billion IQD (21%) Transportation & Communications: ~590.828 billion IQD (20%) Services & Roads: ~1.491 trillion IQD (49%) Education & Training: ~243.031 billion IQD (8%) 🔹 Summary Comparison: Total Revenue: 46.157 trillion IQD Total Expenditure: 46.979 trillion IQD Deficit: ~822.146 billion IQD

10 Reasons for the Decline in the Dollar Exchange Rate Against the Iraqi Dinar

By: Manar Obeidi – Economic Expert Recently, the exchange rate of the US dollar against the Iraqi dinar has witnessed a significant decline. This drop can be traced back to a combination of economic factors and governmental measures, each with varying degrees of impact, but collectively contributing to the strengthening of the dinar. The most notable of these factors are: Economic Stability and Restoration of Public Confidence The uncertainty in Iraq’s market due to economic stagnation led to a loss of confidence among individuals and institutions in spending. This negatively impacted overall demand, especially for the dollar as a tool for trade, causing a decline in its demand. Reduction in Government Spending and Investment The government's focus on reducing operational expenses over capital investments has contributed to slowing down economic activity. Since public spending is a major driver of economic activities, its reduction has led to decreased general demand, including the demand for dollars. Tightening Border Controls Government actions to curb smuggling and regulate trade relations with the Kurdistan Region have helped limit the illegal outflow of dollars through the black market, reducing unregulated demand. Shift of Traders to the Formal Banking System Many traders have moved to the formal banking system and now rely on official exchange rates via approved platforms. This has shrunk the size of trade in the black market, thereby reducing pressure on the dollar. Decline in Re-export Activities The slowdown in re-exporting goods to neighboring countries has led to reduced demand for imported goods. Consequently, this reduced the need for dollars used in acquiring assets for such trade. Payment in Oil Instead of Cash to Foreign Companies The government has compensated some foreign companies with crude oil and naphtha instead of cash. This reduced the volume of dollars that the Central Bank needs to sell, lowering their market presence and exchange pressure. Preparation for the Election Process As the election season starts, campaign expenses have increased. Since much of this spending is converted from dollars, the process creates a need to exchange large amounts of dollars for dinars, which increases dinar demand and reduces dollar value. Increase in Number of Foreign Visitors The rise in the number of foreigners entering Iraq has injected a significant amount of foreign currency into local markets. This became an alternative source of dollar liquidity outside the central bank’s sales, contributing to dollar surplus. Cessation of Illicit Trade Due to Border Closure with Syria The closure of border crossings with Syria has led to a decrease in smuggling and illicit trade, which largely relied on black market dollars. This directly reduced illegal dollar demand. Withdrawal of Excess Cash from the Market The Central Bank of Iraq has pulled back part of the cash dinar in circulation. This created a relative increase in demand for the dinar against the dollar, helping to elevate its value and stabilize the exchange rate in parallel markets. These are the primary factors contributing to the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar against the Iraqi dinar. The question remains: to what extent does each factor influence the official exchange rate? It’s possible that other, less visible factors may also play a role. In my opinion, categorizing these causes by their level of influence could help in evaluating their specific impact on the exchange rate in both official and parallel markets.

"KRG officials are experienced in leveraging their ties with the U.S. to gain concessions from Baghdad"

Former Iraqi Minister of Justice: 🔻 The oil agreement between Baghdad and Erbil is temporary and hasn’t resolved the deep-rooted disputes. 🔻 KRG officials are experienced in leveraging their ties with the U.S. to gain concessions from Baghdad. Statement: Hassan al-Shammari, the former Iraqi Minister of Justice, stated that the oil agreement between Baghdad and Erbil is a temporary solution tied to the current phase, especially as Iraq approaches elections. He stressed the need to stabilize the situation. In an interview with Al-Ahd TV channel, Shammari said the agreement has not addressed the underlying major disputes between the two sides. He also pointed to the potential influence of American pressure, as the U.S. reportedly played a role in facilitating the agreement. He explained that KRG officials are adept at strengthening their relations with the U.S. to extract political or financial gains from Baghdad. He further emphasized: Iraq’s current financial restrictions are genuine, not merely excuses, and the country’s internal debt has reached 47 trillion dinars. Regarding corruption, he noted that the rapid spread of corruption has become a serious challenge, to the extent that it has even affected the position of some political forces, making them reluctant to support the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law.

More than 6 billion dollars... Iraq’s oil revenue for last month

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil has announced the final data on oil exports and revenues for June. According to the data released by the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), Iraq exported a total of 98,882,613 barrels of oil during the past month. The total revenue from oil sales in the previous month was more than $6,698,021,000 (approximately USD 6.69 billion). Oil exports during June were distributed across Iraq’s oil-producing regions as follows: From central and southern Iraq fields: 97,718,994 barrels From the Gyara field: 946,741 barrels Oil exported to Jordan: 216,878 barrels

Iraq's Federal Supreme Court Rejects Lawsuits to Dissolve Kurdistan Parliament

The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq has dismissed two lawsuits calling for the dissolution of the Kurdistan Parliament. The first lawsuit was filed by Omar Abdullah Fattah, known as "Omar Gulpi," a leadership member of the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG). In his complaint against the President of the Kurdistan Region and the Speaker of the Parliament, Gulpi had requested the Federal Court to dissolve the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament. The basis for his claim was that the first session of this term, held on December 2, 2025, failed to elect a parliamentary presidency within the 45 days stipulated by the internal procedures following the ratification of the election results. Omar Gulpi, himself a winning candidate in the Kurdistan elections who did not take his seat due to his party's decision, also demanded that the court order the recovery of all material benefits received by the 97 winning candidates after they took their oaths. The Kurdistan Parliament has 100 seats in this term, but Gulpi counted only 97, as he, Abdulstar Majid of the KJG, and Lahur Sheikh Jangi have not yet taken their legal oaths. Furthermore, he requested the Federal Court to compel the commission to prepare for new parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region as soon as possible. The second lawsuit was filed by Sarwa Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation Movement's faction, along with parliamentarians Kawa Abdulqadir and Kurdawan Jamal. The plaintiffs filed their case against the President of the Kurdistan Region, requesting that the court overturn the President's decision not to dissolve the parliament. They argued that the parliament's failure to elect its leadership and grant confidence to the Council of Ministers constitutes a violation of Article (10/Fourth/3) of the Kurdistan Region's Presidency Law No. (1) of 2005. This article states: "The Kurdistan National Assembly - Iraq shall be dissolved by decree in the following cases: 3- If the assembly fails to grant confidence to the Council of Ministers in three different and consecutive ministerial formations." The Federal Court rejected all the lawsuits, stating that the matter does not fall within its jurisdiction. This is the second ruling in favor of the two ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region since the new president of the Federal Court took office. Yesterday, the same court rejected two lawsuits seeking to annul the oil contracts signed by Masrour Barzani in the United States.

The agreement is initial and subject to further review

In total, the Iraqi federal government will spend 1 trillion and 100 billion dinars monthly for the Kurdistan Region, including salaries and company costs. The Kurdistan Region, in return, will provide revenues totaling 270 billion dinars, consisting of: 230,000 barrels of oil per day 120 billion dinars from internal revenues Initially, the federal government will cover salaries for May and June, which will be transferred through the “My Account” system. This agreement is preliminary, not final. It is part of an understanding between Erbil and Baghdad to open the door for salary payments for Kurdistan Region employees. Agreement Details: KRG will transfer 230,000 barrels of oil daily to SOMO (Iraq's oil marketing company) for one month. KRG keeps 52,000 barrels per day for local use. A joint committee from Erbil and Baghdad will later determine the quantity of oil allocated for local use. The estimated cost per barrel for production and transportation is $16. Key Transfers: KRG will provide: 230,000 barrels per day to SOMO 120 billion dinars per month from local revenue Iraq will provide: $16 per barrel for oil production costs (to be paid to companies) 1 trillion and 30 billion dinars per month for salaries (but 60–65 billion dinars will be deducted monthly to repay debts and tax advances) This means that about 958 billion dinars will be sent to the Kurdistan Region each month. Oil Revenue Calculation: Oil price assumed: $65 per barrel Daily revenue: 230,000 × $65 = $14.95 million Monthly revenue: $14.95 million × 30 = $448.5 million, approximately 600 billion dinars Oil cost (paid by Baghdad to companies): $16 × 230,000 barrels/day = $3.68 million/day Monthly: 9.9 million barrels × $16 = $158.4 million, approx. 150 billion dinars Summary of Financial Flows: KRG gives: 230,000 barrels of oil/day = approx. 600 billion dinars/month 120 billion dinars from local revenues Iraq gives: 958 billion dinars in net salary payments 150 billion dinars to oil companies for production costs Net benefit for Baghdad: Receives 720 billion dinars in total value Spends 1 trillion and 108 billion dinars Net deficit for Baghdad: about 400 billion dinars According to KRG officials, this is a preliminary agreement and a step toward a broader long-term deal. The federal government will send salaries for a few months as a start, and both sides will continue negotiating a more comprehensive financial settlement.

Ministerial Committee Meeting Ends Without Results

The ministerial committee of the Iraqi Council of Ministers reached no result or decision and ended its meeting. Yesterday, the ministerial committee held its first meeting, and according to a statement from the Ministry of Planning, chaired by Minister Dr. Mohammed Tamim, the meeting discussed both drafts (of the agreements). However, there was no indication of any agreement or progress. A well-informed source told Draw Media that during yesterday’s meeting, no agreement or outcome was reached, and there was no consensus on either draft. This is because Baghdad disagreed with one of the key articles in the draft, particularly regarding the handover of oil and the Kurdistan Region's commitment to the federal budget law and decisions of the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq. Today’s meeting was also cancelled, even though it was scheduled to be completed within 48 hours—meaning the committee was supposed to submit its final report to the Prime Minister of Iraq for a final decision. In last Tuesday’s meeting of the Iraqi Council of Ministers, a decision was made to form a ministerial committee to resolve the salary and oil dispute. The committee members are: Mohammed Tamim – Minister of Planning (Committee Chair) Khalid Shwani – Minister of Justice Salih Mahdi Hasnawi – Minister of Health Bangin Rekani – Minister of Reconstruction Naeem Aboudi – Minister of Higher Education

Salaries and Revenues of the Kurdistan Regional Government After Oil Export Halt

Following the Paris court’s decision to halt the Kurdistan Region’s independent oil exports, significant financial changes have occurred in the Region’s relationship with Baghdad. 🔹 Baghdad's Funding to the KRG: From March 25, 2023, to June 2025 (27 months), the Iraqi government transferred around 19.6 trillion IQD to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This amount covered 21 months of salaries in full (100%). 🔹 Oil Revenues of the KRG: During the same period, the Region generated about 9.94 trillion IQD from oil revenues. Only 6% of this amount (598.5 billion IQD) was returned to the Iraqi government, while the remaining 94% (over 9.3 trillion IQD) stayed within the KRG. 🔹 Monthly Oil Sales Estimate: Based on unofficial data, the KRG's oil sales currently generate approximately $297 million per month, of which: 72% (about $213 million) goes to the KRG, 28% (around $84 million) goes to the oil companies. None of this revenue is returned to the KRG's Ministry of Finance officially. 🔹 Oil Production & Pricing: The Region operates eight oil fields producing around 300,000 barrels daily, totaling roughly 9 million barrels monthly. The average sale price per barrel is estimated at $34. 🔹 Backstory – Paris Court Ruling: Though the Paris court ruling barred the KRG from exporting oil via Turkey’s Ceyhan port, the KRG continued producing and selling oil, mostly via unofficial or domestic channels, often below the global market price. This lack of transparency has deepened fiscal disputes with Baghdad. 🔹 Federal Budget Allocations: Due to the export halt, Baghdad was forced to allocate KRG’s share from the federal budget. Official documents confirm: In 2023, Baghdad sent 4.7 trillion IQD to the KRG. In 2024, the total rose to 10.78 trillion IQD. In early 2025, 4.1 trillion IQD was sent. However, in May and June 2025, no payments were made. 🔹 Missed Salary Months: Despite receiving full funding for 21 months, the KRG failed to pay salaries for six specific months

Iraqi Army Seeks Control of Qambar Oil Field in Disputed Area

The Iraqi army is reportedly preparing to take control of the Qambar oil field, located within the disputed area near the border between Diyala and Sulaymaniyah provinces, currently under Peshmerga control. According to the pro-Asaib Ahl al-Haq TV channel "Al-Ahd", citing security sources, tension and unrest have escalated around the Qambar oil field, which lies between Diyala and Sulaymaniyah in the area known as Dwanza Imam village. An Iraqi army unit has reportedly moved toward the area, with preparations underway to establish federal authority over this strategic location. Peshmerga leaders view this move as provocative and warn that it could trigger a crisis. Sources noted that the area is currently under the control of forces affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Amid warnings of potential armed clashes in one of the most disputed areas between the federal and regional governments, local villagers have expressed concern over recent unusual military activity, including the presence of unidentified troops. Political sources familiar with the situation predict the crisis could escalate in the coming days if Baghdad and Erbil fail to take coordinated steps to de-escalate tensions and prevent any armed conflict—raising fears of a broader threat to the stability of the disputed boundary between Diyala and Sulaymaniyah.

Iraq and Kurdistan Region Near Final Deal on Salaries, Oil Exports, and Internal Revenues

The Kurdistan Region and Baghdad have reached a preliminary agreement on salaries, the budget, and oil. Today, the Iraqi Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs will prepare the final report on the agreement. Baghdad is requesting the delivery of 280,000 barrels per day to SOMO and a monthly transfer of 150 billion dinars in internal revenues. The Kurdistan Region, in turn, wants Baghdad to cover salaries, operating expenses, and investment spending for the Region, with $16 allocated per barrel for costs and 125,000 barrels designated for local use. The Iraqi Economic Affairs Council, chaired by Dr. Fuad Hussein and including the Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Oil, will finalize the agreement. A final decision will be made at the Council of Ministers' meeting. According to the information: Baghdad demands around 150 billion dinars per month in internal revenue and the delivery of 280,000 barrels of oil daily via SOMO. In return, Baghdad would cover the Region's public sector salaries, operational costs, and oil company expenditures. The Kurdistan Region’s demands include: Baghdad to send salaries of the Region’s public servants. Coverage of operational and investment costs. Salaries to be paid from actual expenses. Oil company debts to be paid. The Region to provide 280,000 barrels to SOMO and 115,000 barrels for local use. $16 to be spent per barrel. Oil companies also have several demands: No changes made to their contracts. Their debts amounting to about $1 billion should be paid. Revenues from their projects in the oil fields to be settled. According to follow-ups: The Iraqi government requests 50% of total internal revenues, estimated at 300 billion dinars, which means 150 billion dinars monthly to be delivered to the Ministry of Finance. The Kurdistan Region is to deliver 280,000 barrels of oil daily via SOMO, with the revenue returned to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. In return, Baghdad will initially pay the May salaries this week as a goodwill gesture and, following a complete agreement, will cover the June salaries as well. For each barrel, Baghdad will pay $16 to the producing companies. With the daily delivery of 280,000 barrels to SOMO and the international market price of around $65 per barrel, the daily revenue would be $18.2 million, and the monthly (8.4 million barrels) revenue would reach $546 million. Of this, $16 per barrel (totaling $134 million monthly) will go to the companies, meaning the Iraqi government retains $412 million. If the Region sells the 280,000 barrels daily at its local price of $33 per barrel, it would generate $277 million monthly—$269 million less than the $546 million possible through SOMO.

KRG to Supply 280,000 Barrels of Oil Daily via SOMO

A technical delegation from Baghdad returned after meetings in the Kurdistan Region, while the KRG delegation also arrived in Baghdad. Baghdad demands a monthly transfer of 150 billion Iraqi dinars from the KRG’s internal revenues and the daily delivery of 280,000 barrels of oil through SOMO. In return, Baghdad will cover public salaries and oil company expenses. Over two days, a technical delegation from the Iraqi government visited the Kurdistan Region and met with the KRG Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Council of Ministers’ Presidency, and oil companies. The Iraqi delegation has now returned to Baghdad. Today, a delegation from the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and the Council of Ministers arrived in Baghdad and held meetings with Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and SOMO, indicating progress toward an agreement. According to follow-up information: The Iraqi government is requesting 50% of the KRG’s internal revenues. These revenues are estimated at 300 billion IQD monthly, meaning the KRG must transfer 150 billion IQD monthly to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. The KRG must export 280,000 barrels of oil daily through SOMO, and the revenue will go to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. In return, Baghdad is expected to pay the salaries for May within this week and will pay June’s salaries after a final agreement is reached. For each barrel, $16 is allocated to oil production companies. With a global market price of approximately $65 per barrel, 280,000 barrels generate about $18.2 million per day, or 8.4 million barrels monthly would yield $546 million in monthly revenue. Out of this, $134 million is spent on production companies ($16 per barrel), meaning the Iraqi government retains about $412 million monthly. If the KRG were to sell the oil independently at its current price of $33 per barrel, the monthly revenue would be $277 million—$269 million less than selling through SOMO at global prices.